Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 78791dfcfa3e9694…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

138.0 KB Created: 2022-02-09 09:48:26 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 46e5fa1f079b901a2736e5e59c65440d SHA-1: 3f12e83e2cd3d7a551ffe628eca6a436680126b9 SHA-256: 78791dfcfa3e9694f9751c62fe15375b1af8cbc23922cf80b621ac82960b2dbb
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The critical heuristic OLE_VBA_CELL_DROPPER_URL indicates that the VBA macro reconstructs and uses a list of 12 URLs to download a payload. The Workbook_Open macro and CreateObject call further support this, suggesting an automated execution upon opening. The ClamAV detection as 'Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02220-9938909-0' strongly suggests a downloader family, likely Emotet.

Heuristics 7

  • URL reconstructed from VBA cell-staged base64 dropper (12 URLs) critical OLE_VBA_CELL_DROPPER_URL
    VBA reads worksheet cells, strips junk substrings via Replace(), and base64/UTF-16 decodes the result into a PowerShell EncodedCommand payload. The download URL is never contiguous in the file bytes; it was recovered by removing the macro's Replace() junk tokens from the cell strings and decoding the staged base64.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02220-9938909-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02220-9938909-0
  • Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://midnightsilvercrafters.com/store/wBjNOUw/
    • http://tempral.com/NATE_05_22_2009/BI710N4cQ6R3/
    • https://redington.karmatechmediaworks.com/wp-content/3JVuVx7QUM/
    • https://uhc.karmatechmediaworks.com/wp-content/0EqfdeznntlOpaIP2Qv/
    • https://servilogic.n
    • https://comezmuhendislik.com/ljfrmm/VTpHRFWoORAHnRQ3aQL/
    • http://webmail.glemedical.com/wp-content/J1M2xxodH/
    • http://toto.karmatechmediaworks.com/wp-content/i826vbcVgRJ/
    • https://golfpia.karmatechmediaworks.com/wp-content/oEicpDnEkk/
    • https://garyjharris.com/cgi-bin/0hH/
    • https://vietnam.karmatechmediaworks.com/wp-content/PfSVQagusZy7AaMw/
    • https://vinculinc.karmatechmediaworks.com/wp-content/VlcOPPwgidWlXDJNs6/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
d0e8795831e6ee1455d1586ea717f9b714b1faf3f6791ff89cf37544cf4c6817		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 52352 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.