Office (OOXML) / .XLSX malware analysis — malicious · 785c48c170d677ce

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSX

52.9 KB Created: 2026-03-09 09:31:44 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 16.0300 First seen: 2026-03-11

MD5: 7a7a99eee3855c2fe0fe0f5c20d0490c SHA-1: 8ad35a846868037787ef8ca0f06c3ad902c234a3 SHA-256: 785c48c170d677ceee0112f843d8959ff7b701866283c2e503451c96c82f63ce

690 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The file contains VBA macros that leverage WScript.Shell and cmd.exe to download and execute a payload. Specifically, the 'OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC' heuristic indicates the macro attempts to download a file using HTTP and save it to disk, followed by execution. The presence of 'Document_Open', 'Workbook_Open', and 'Auto_Open' macros, along with obfuscated code and calls to CreateObject and Shell(), strongly suggests a downloader or initial execution stage for malware.

Heuristics 16

Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL

Shell() call in VBA
WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT

WScript.Shell usage
PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS

PowerShell reference in VBA
VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC

VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER

Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Valyria-10013249-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Valyria-10013249-0
ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV

ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN

Document_Open macro
Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPEN

Workbook_Open macro
Auto_Open macro high OLE_VBA_AUTO

Auto_Open macro
CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ

CreateObject call
cmd.exe reference in VBA high OLE_VBA_CMD

cmd.exe reference in VBA
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC

Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA

Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON

Environ() call (env variable access)
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://www.google.com
- http://www.microsoft.com

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `844e7e8038f62d105b790cd18399e15f463fc4b399ca4ae67cb43a2b63e9a5f8`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML)	44172 bytes
`vbaProject_00.bin` `2b4c5fc74810ef236558f1a6a97eec7f84a344db0196405e38e20fc19e379a93`	vba-project	OOXML VBA project: xl/vbaProject.bin	111616 bytes
Detection ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Valyria-10013249-0 Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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