RTF malware analysis — malicious · 784efe9ef1e0155c

MALICIOUS

RTF

41.1 KB First seen: 2023-07-12

MD5: a5eb370d5497c46e48b580f9b96f306f SHA-1: 2128d23af11a396b0408417c3925665fdfdb4fc6 SHA-256: 784efe9ef1e0155ca9ecd6b8c040454c8a9bd12faaab454a012bb78b5c84ad10

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The \objupdate directive further suggests that the object is intended to be activated automatically upon opening or enabling editing. The document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', a common tactic to bypass security measures and execute malicious content.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00004d46.bin` `2f219ca002318cd3de380aa035f978885d27157e9ba88bf416a578ba94d2e1cd`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x4D46	1817 bytes

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