Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 78240ae9254b997a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

82.0 KB Created: 2021-08-23 12:29:14 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2026-06-16
MD5: e6bed376ffa1c90e1b79498189f95df1 SHA-1: 296270fd4930bc0b1bf3c60831b011a25f44fb78 SHA-256: 78240ae9254b997ae238a55d7489822992d1bec63e4c2e397f67050a3891cde9
236 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9917

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) or Microsoft license-boilerplate documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.fmworks.com.tr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/95dqigs8u05efl0cmthksugnil/64066476044.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://bagiez.com/userfiles/file/xolukodeso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://resheto.ru/users_images//fck/file/37428369919.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fablab808.com/nbloom/fckuploads/file/11456819124.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.hgbehringer.de/img/files/files/kagugimiriwujuwosamafobu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bptramptour.pl/files/file/muvixu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://108shiva.com/userfiles/file/In PDF document text
    • http://accessprecision.com/userfiles/file/tidorunesevusare.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://realestateconnect.pro/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/l2vnhcn3aijego2hbqsj9hbqo3/27743795120.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://alphacleanwashing.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/68ebcb2e072b9ee6f91312d539f79081/48208877773.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tefen67.com/userfiles/files/1518263538.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://i-daa-wl.de/userfiles/jaluveguvulaxesupatinesi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.kadeavenue.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/75c78bd75dfb8c2241a89e29d568b137/58520579642.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://banhangcongnghe.com/upload/FCK/file/29689445521.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fatheragneliti.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a11dcfe9a87---86104490298.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://livingkaneohe.com/userimages/rosase.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mmckno2010.zkosuchdol.info/files/wibedutegonoronir.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ballarioarchitetti.eu/userfiles/files/503934706.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.acefence.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609d1611d35c7---51459474362.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://razvozka24.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5a3d5ae10730fe69a8b3018f9cc04ea0/95824184283.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://arhometutor.com/userfiles/file/kinulavazexasosadewuratus.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hoangle.vn/uploads/userfiles/file/pazetikulok.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aptitudeclass.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/15615491955.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.jahnigterbraak.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607088a33832a---judajorom.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://malimbe.africa/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/fad50c9a9096d0cf17c8d6c233381c5d/xirepurupidi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://edusfera.pl/upload/file/68171812352.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/1KS0DP0cxss/uplcv?utm_term=powershell+serialize+jsonPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_0001428d.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x1428D 1576 bytes
SHA-256: 432d7a3b43ec1c8a80e6813f57d722253572551a23d73451823799c4dea1cae5
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='PDF Studio'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Sarobiza Lacoke</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Powershell serialize json.       I recently wrote PSDeploy, a quick-and-dirty module to abstract out PowerShell based deploymen</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Powershell serialize json.       I recently wrote PSDeploy, a quick-and-dirty module to abstract out PowerShell based deploymen</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Powershell serialize json</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='PDF Studio'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-02-16T12:55:57'
  xmp:CreatorTool='PDF Studio'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='1236c9e4-fe42-402d-927b-8347c778256b'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='cae0eea4-e0e2-4e9c-aca3-30240585c9f4'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000db5e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDB5E 17836 bytes
SHA-256: c3cf16354c1ae4e8955cc10ffb7f97cb890368b4b62f58db7335c7db2bcf8e0c
font_01_sfnt_off00010a93.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10A93 10384 bytes
SHA-256: 752a6efd8ae4e9736ea319cb1b50d23060a6bcfa17eac35f9b37b8600a58aa70
font_02_sfnt_off00012209.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12209 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.