Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 781e783c639985e5…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.7 KB
MD5: 6d4955b5eb33401af937ca5ac6293eaf SHA-1: a870622d57b0a813eb40d3b32f712ba182429506 SHA-256: 781e783c639985e532ccb361dddd1fb381fe318db014e20fd4976020bcf29321
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. This indicates an attempt to exploit a client execution vulnerability, likely delivered as a spearphishing attachment. No further IOCs were extracted from the file.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000d3.bin
6a6c543b59455de7b4fdae49f97d43aea5bf0044fc50e6c1157f3a65a6d61aef
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD3 1572 bytes