Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7814930df00e8e8a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.46 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-07-11
MD5: df3c282b2c7ad95153cf0bdd7e267394 SHA-1: 26e87ccceecf8d3425085c0866840cf7290b4483 SHA-256: 7814930df00e8e8a3d2224f26feb171fbf87881b5d70135cd31d331d1af905d0
272 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious File T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The sample is an Excel file containing an embedded Equation Editor OLE object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This object contains a secondary PDF payload which, in turn, has a direct link to an executable or archive. The PDF also exhibits parser evasion techniques and combines external actions with suspicious structures, indicating a multi-stage attack. The VBA macros are empty, suggesting the exploit is solely reliant on the OLE object.

Heuristics 8

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 8

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
1159d8ce559bc64a223d229e880bab939d9c3cc0487ae3bd193d658196bae2a4		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD000A9F72/olE10NativE 1322 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off0000817d.bin
68d167e68895a344f3603a4efd0d8438eb8fdebe759cee48f2b4adf75c76c961		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x817D 12100 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00009f95.bin
50551000b9f90b3f445ee94749557d9ddf96697a74984b3ccf3d2bae66910750		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9F95 15820 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001000.pdf
f3f0b833eda74f08c4d8a88cf59ed2346291a6e1dcd46b95048b13e1630e6264		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1000 1529344 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006200.pdf
80f13a16efe127bdd2e5d0d5e34e8ce10dcf6904876b6230eab5cec7f581bbfe		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6200 1508352 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0000e400.pdf
e8ce97edb902bf23738ce110304e2ce85e5540e43d9069898a753b6c8b32f3c8		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE400 1475072 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0002d000.pdf
dd1a7bbd39e4fe0ae1dc377d8f3d3486c11f8aff00e044ef5a59cf4bc310cf76		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x2D000 1349120 bytes

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