Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 780b24ef86dcb0e7…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

743.2 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: c6945f8cec9296ec1f858b00b03f6f1c SHA-1: b22888cb98186b7d6c4540a3f30213196703221f SHA-256: 780b24ef86dcb0e71f7e4425d23de81fae1e867e0384b6ba4a2dbbcbb31e98cf
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The critical heuristic firings for RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and CVE_2017_8759 indicate exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability. The RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristic suggests that the embedded OLE object is designed to be activated, leading to code execution. While no specific second-stage payload URLs were extracted, the exploitation pattern strongly suggests the intent to download and execute further malicious content.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000abcc8.bin
95a9fd084e1c3598ff751db60821008cdb872c8192f3ed974e67ca4a42701416		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xABCC8 3732 bytes

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