Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7804e3a1f55f2a53…

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.9 KB Created: 2020-07-08 12:15:02 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 638bce433f3b7fc7aa0a34850b503378 SHA-1: f1011ef010a670e459bc1f79065f124d45c43b20 SHA-256: 7804e3a1f55f2a53a13823f138187e291ecdb21413b232fda37ed53e9e1e2b6e
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains a large number of links to external websites, many of which are hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious infrastructure. The primary redirector URL is identified as malicious. The document body text, while appearing to be a grammar worksheet, contains these embedded malicious links, suggesting a lure for phishing or malware delivery.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/wb?keyword=wh%20questions%20grammar%20worksheet
    • http://files.sisterspiritwomensharingspirituality.org/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815154/58853863.pdf
    • http://files.meridianbodycare.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857193/6976761.pdf
    • http://files.plumascorporation.org/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379325/guluxaxaporobusa.pdf
    • http://files.la-enthusiast.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969674/3236423.pdf
    • http://files.cateringandcreations.net/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814513/9295549.pdf
    • http://files.parkhillbowlingclub.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815154/4047543.pdf
    • http://files.madlyeclectic.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131483253/nuwitoduku_xafozovininu_lekilirox_navagad.pdf
    • http://files.kocanada-usa.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437538/zorodoke.pdf
    • http://files.mybodyofknowledge.net/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695839/4532903.pdf
    • http://files.threecreekaussies.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132710655/sujut.pdf
    • http://files.cvilleclergycollective.org/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398591/kavipubuvelerop.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://wasukajam.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/bizotelot.pdf
    • https://napipivo.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/90453846306.pdf
    • https://vivixuzu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/61446342765.pdf
    • https://bisogupawike.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/69086001053.pdf
    • https://vobenixabew.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/xesujonupot.pdf
    • https://tumolodiku.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/89325517544.pdf
    • https://bewenaxo.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/vonanotid.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00004d62.bin
b21bad90452380032cf81432020a22bdd52f9e16f991c3593e119df3e8b164e7
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4D62 5244 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00005f1c.bin
8e0055d5067ec3d73922f84169ed06ae3a70c5d228e848660f568059f90393ea
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5F1C 9900 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000812d.bin
a95eff378c135b1ab40d10b3cd1da1bafbc07f86005f57898d079c90d712ddbd
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x812D 16204 bytes