Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 77dae083a86108af…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

533.4 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 69d8b93d9f0174a8a7b8f6c951ad94b7 SHA-1: 2a2ded7c7fcc6f5a3f80b205e824ea05b4451c8a SHA-256: 77dae083a86108afad20c3acc0664aba6260fa403b645887c63deeafef4be52f
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The file is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor. Critical heuristics indicate exploitation of CVE-2017-8759, which allows for OLE activation and arbitrary code execution. The embedded object data is likely the exploit payload, designed to leverage this vulnerability.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0007d171.bin
df6e459825b2ae4c9de585293973b79e46cdeb4d39c61672692dafa62d67499b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x7D171 3739 bytes