Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 77d080c5358914b4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

217.9 KB
MD5: 81e285100f1a3fbcd6d25947526ffe26 SHA-1: 86133dfdc155d4076dea0d412c1a4dc3e91d6506 SHA-256: 77d080c5358914b44a23edf389635103b723a855bac6c6da196d5476964d0a29
336 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and a Flash RichMedia object that exploits CVE-2010-1297. The JavaScript is heavily obfuscated but appears to be responsible for triggering the Flash exploit, which in turn likely executes a second-stage payload. The embedded SWF file and the URLs associated with code.flashdynamix.com are suspicious and likely involved in the exploit chain.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9806

Heuristics 9

  • Adobe Flash authplay SWF exploit in PDF — CVE-2010-1297 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_1297_FLASH_RICHMEDIA
    PDF combines RichMedia Flash activation, a crafted SWF with ActionScript prototype/AVM-era markers or the AES-PHP/authplay variant markers, and PDF-side shellcode heap-spray staging. This is the static delivery shape associated with CVE-2010-1297 in Adobe Reader's bundled authplay.dll.
  • Hex-obfuscated scripting name object critical PDF_OBFUSCATED_NAME_OBJECT
    A PDF name object that drives script execution (/JavaScript or /JS) is written with #XX hex escapes to hide it from string-based scanners — e.g. /J#61v#61S#63r#69p#74 decoding to /JavaScript. Legitimate PDF producers always write these names literally; hex-encoding an executable name is a deliberate evasion used by exploit-kit and dropper PDFs.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-35955 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-35955
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA
    PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://code.flashdynamix.com/AES/aes-decrypt.php
    • http://code.flashdynamix.com/AES/aes-encrypt.php
    • http://adobe.com/AS3/2006/builtin

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
WpuVlEGnF.swf
bf9dea6ff47dfb47c2f51b1fa9a09527dfe5e95399ccb2d043ba956b197360c9
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 16 at offset 0x2FD5E 52647 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-35955
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
javascript_obj0006_000.js
adddc6330c1fade3051c55a3e6d184f626d547a717e6ef8569bd3481d61d86ae
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 6 at offset 0x13E 6478 bytes