Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 77b1eb24d0043e27…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

79.0 KB Created: 2006-01-25 08:30:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: de026886a3e9bf7cae64761c4c34599c SHA-1: c348bc39c1a73d68892452052ec6d24e9fd423f1 SHA-256: 77b1eb24d0043e27dd2bcc2a7d337b28d9c59e35ad2834462ae896eb16df15df
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1071.001 Web Protocols

The sample is an OLE document with a significant slack space anomaly, indicating potential obfuscation or embedded malicious content. Heuristics indicate the use of Windows API functions like VirtualAlloc, VirtualProtect, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress, which are commonly used by malware to allocate memory, load dynamic-link libraries, and resolve function addresses for executing shellcode or downloading secondary payloads. No document body text or scripts were extracted, limiting the ability to determine the exact payload or delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 6

  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 80,912 bytes but its declared streams total only 21,151 bytes — 59,761 bytes (74%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API
  • Reference to VirtualProtect API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECT
    Reference to VirtualProtect API
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliography
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/customXml

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