Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 77a60b9665b4c23a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.7 KB Created: 2020-10-15 01:36:32 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-17
MD5: 5698f467689eb26c8179ac0c7f624a8c SHA-1: 17ea55bd3b1b78f4147d9adde2b5f6111dec4e71 SHA-256: 77a60b9665b4c23aef86b3355cabb65b2fa7d3aed12b8ea85a83232d93df8e9e
184 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=wifi+tether+apk+no+root In PDF document text
    • https://guwomenod.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873843/filosom-lusiwikafese-jerupuxorukoti-novubolifunuw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jawasolasazilem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379174/zuvefusu_tewojawowebav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://texitanoz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739996/taxisogo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366989/normal_5f876d4c1514d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366324/normal_5f873a3f8693b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kekerisasil.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775365/4b78e02fcdea11.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mogezisatizate.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775403/e98d3333872.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kupugaxome.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969415/4384628.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lagukekejase.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130815031/de03b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dutitujazekap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814390/xereromejiv-koxozirusoror-moxonujis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1043582.mozfiles.com/files/1043582/71295526338.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037044.mozfiles.com/files/1037044/53274805655.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xojerajap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384359/9611648.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gimejexoxixaza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131872185/kadupe_ripovu_jozovagazemewe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://guwomenod.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873843/2a5b38eef3430.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b717764a-3d87-4eb4-bd33-4ac5e8b665a0/39344152162.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4ea9a5c3-a516-4f89-995d-70ff92b1ab49/femex.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005cbb.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5CBB 4856 bytes
SHA-256: d2c2139e40b8f9a6eaf198e200c876263682c3cc9cb02cef073cedf190277c82
font_01_sfnt_off00006d48.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6D48 9932 bytes
SHA-256: 6cb45bad7040a4cc6ae5d70da84b03ea4eea91780adc3ecbaf43a687a6f29052
font_02_sfnt_off00008f7f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8F7F 16660 bytes
SHA-256: 682a406efcdf7dd49f9c494c129bca6394f160b3e372cc4ba493723cd6bcd7e0

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