Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 77897dbaf3c5a358…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.4 KB Created: 2020-09-30 13:54:11 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-15
MD5: e10b355046a169a1d2ed2814a3a20cbe SHA-1: febbbb8b1e9f5a81abddd95e8d71ee9f0e3f9335 SHA-256: 77897dbaf3c5a358385a188565dea91b2b48b8e7eed079cc0a8e5ef167e63ada
184 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=picture+dictionary+cambridge+pdf In PDF document text
    • https://site-1037091.mozfiles.com/files/1037091/55467938583.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037283.mozfiles.com/files/1037283/fofimigexan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037166.mozfiles.com/files/1037166/38621168198.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037057.mozfiles.com/files/1037057/jubedunapadijilow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037156.mozfiles.com/files/1037156/10827372766.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036626.mozfiles.com/files/1036626/7165821085.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037833.mozfiles.com/files/1037833/tugurovos.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036951.mozfiles.com/files/1036951/latugumajotafilu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.brickovendough.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856887/wiwujokupodewu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.jamorrowfreeman.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302888/dd5744bf1f51a9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.jamesmatthewwilson.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637057/d1e23bb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zepala.gaylewinndesigns.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132303382/jozezanuda-buneboso-nawijil-sozirazor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.psalmstre.net/uploads/1/3/2/6/132696323/fokekadaxupun.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036932.mozfiles.com/files/1036932/velumozijabimaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036997.mozfiles.com/files/1036997/wonigeveberurifagegol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036939.mozfiles.com/files/1036939/77119224041.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036939.mozfiles.com/files/1036939/30169165890.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005e84.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5E84 5388 bytes
SHA-256: 776bef6d36ca9acf6b1a52917c0618c999511e3aac08613cf5383bcd9f004bf4
font_01_sfnt_off000070c0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x70C0 9904 bytes
SHA-256: 5756b8ed27f17930902b287138b1d139940729c0624eddbd9e48a69b7ecfbf01
font_02_sfnt_off00009256.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9256 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 1158d95dac44631f497756703988ba3645251422e7ff0015d3fca430225e7c3e

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