Office (OLE) / .PGP static analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 776813f853657b3a…

SUSPICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .PGP

28.5 KB Created: 2001-01-07 12:37:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word 9.0
MD5: 343fc421b1c54652194b3970c725211d SHA-1: 1707e3b7263ce92e81ab18cd40882db252ab4417 SHA-256: 776813f853657b3a8dade75f14096a58ddd2e5e86065a6d5ef3ab53d6246c517
40 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Protocol T1110 Brute Force

The AutoClose VBA macro executes a Shell command to upload the user's PGP private key ('Secring.skr') to an FTP server at '209.201.88.110'. The script attempts to bypass detection by checking for the presence of a registry key before proceeding. This indicates an attempt to steal sensitive cryptographic material.

Heuristics 4

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Auto_Close macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE
    Auto_Close macro
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Macro capabilities present but unconfirmed info MACRO_CAPABILITY_UNCORROBORATED
    The document's VBA exposes execution capabilities (Shell/WScript/CreateObject/auto-exec) but nothing corroborates malicious intent — no obfuscation, memory-exec primitive, download+exec chain, encoded payload, LOLBin, DDE, AV hit, or suspicious URL. The verdict was capped at 'suspicious' so legitimate macro-heavy business documents are not flagged malicious on capability presence alone.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
6bf45a510fc59c5310b9f7db9295ddc4a7f945b24e173a749466a87fe4dd29d4
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2082 bytes