Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7710e33adfb5af12…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.8 KB Created: 2020-11-02 18:21:33 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-31
MD5: a2691970e903ca96d7184e05b6cc148e SHA-1: 17b3e5634b4cbc57ded37cfe1722fe7f26584389 SHA-256: 7710e33adfb5af12917e8f19607f26466e3ececa56637bbb9d7d2dabf04a8feb
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document contains a large number of embedded links, many pointing to disposable hosting services, and one specifically to a known malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains text related to instructional strategies and the malicious URL, suggesting a lure to phishing or malware download sites. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/aws?keyword=types+of+instructional+strategies+ppt In PDF document text
    • https://pavowojavujide.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398322/murusugase-sidagotakem-kamesadomodater.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sizukejagu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681884/wujulafo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tidemipevu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740592/bukuzopuzir-mikuxerojaweta-dapudokurogova-kowalime.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://riragojefo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857115/6182291.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sirawomaperuli.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398091/b612eaae80.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://daxuregivav.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134431970/9976894.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zuxadol/losisawikobofone.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/2333a43f-6ea9-421e-af39-c1dfbb421d79/mekewiw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/06b532a1-28fd-4c16-af8f-59a52267f66d/favinurudos.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/2ad5cb8a-160b-47b0-b14e-fd74733db06c/93303714866.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/5f5e48ad-77df-4639-9eab-6e5972f722c0/73670149188.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ebd340b5-eb85-41eb-ba13-7d06efddaa2b/6682033967.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/09cd1387-485c-412b-841e-7b23f3809966/wipumil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/robumuduluwise/kiwoxixofoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/7dfa425e-c41c-494e-a97a-719fc856875f/avogadros_law_formula_example_problems.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000061f6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x61F6 5116 bytes
SHA-256: 8b8849140c7574cc64f565fa73a49c03428bec3d9b1eac1ee25825a9495d8d21
font_01_sfnt_off00007378.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7378 11376 bytes
SHA-256: 70c0420fb93403f1d62a81469a57e7c8751339f428b08ce8cabb20f7d06d7257
font_02_sfnt_off00009820.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9820 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 0d0f64e27578eb124b8bc81c7eceacdd166e22eddd95c81328e9fbd7de2a6333

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