Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 76e00ecc7537ea6d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

66.9 KB Created: 2020-12-27 15:36:21 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-15
MD5: 9888eb85e9fa5e263c4359f61ab9ecbb SHA-1: e0938475e7b4bd71181c7e280851b3394bd9775a SHA-256: 76e00ecc7537ea6dca8a833557f31ba3efdb7043506ad49abbdcbdcc590df31c
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file is identified as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. It functions as a link farm, presenting numerous external links, many hosted on disposable domains like 'weebly.com', under the guise of offering a free Adobe PDF download. The primary URL, 'https://trafffe.ru/aws?utm_term=baixar+adobe+pdf+gratuito', further reinforces the lure. The PDF's structure and the presence of many external links suggest it is designed to redirect users to phishing sites or download further malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafffe.ru/aws?utm_term=baixar+adobe+pdf+gratuito PDF link annotation
    • https://roxexiku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134445291/miderat.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nabatiniwoz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134889778/9537676.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vimikipemaw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134331773/sesajaresegexuvopog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://texelerozalom.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135314582/5907917.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4379363/normal_5fc799eb6229a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pinozawekik.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134589254/melusosegexa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/wotutovebo/jcjdIlD/tobijatifakumu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jagunafine.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134363358/9510525.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jeluxipofike.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134490416/nezunugulovesaji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/lixejudazeza/jiJgejd/illuminati_mlg_clicker_mod_apk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sibevuguz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134859718/245152.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gubojipupulep.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134359502/wuzorolekuta.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wumunelopilum.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134395902/6028919.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://navubuxodogonid.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135327143/7157073.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xeroguru/53645852635.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/poresi/93532134327.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ca3e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCA3E 5256 bytes
SHA-256: f67c2a764b9d155fce59ef6efffcf87c797fa04d0e135e8395495bd7868c45bf
font_01_sfnt_off0000dc35.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDC35 10204 bytes
SHA-256: f60e507d22a3164a548f61f23d8cd07910787c4d129413ba95b7fe63ddbfa2c8