Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 76dfb0e8e48b44cb…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

77.5 KB
MD5: 9288eb2cbbbb37dda26366981c241aee SHA-1: 93de7cc0007b932f48d8cba4df27fd8e9f5b7013 SHA-256: 76dfb0e8e48b44cba5c8c74792169b58e3843809f97430e113aa137815361aa2
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that leverages a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. The \objupdate directive forces the activation of this object, which is designed to execute arbitrary code. This technique is commonly used to download and run a second-stage payload, leading to a malicious infection.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001059.bin
4b66a40deafcc45e64b2c2f16b522bad8ea080ce73fe860e48c31d4b81c45b15
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1059 1695 bytes