Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 76dbff8597d2b867…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

211.5 KB Created: 2026-04-16 05:27:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000 First seen: 2026-04-17
MD5: 1122a857a51eefdcb0781c14627ca434 SHA-1: 8fe36c86361eaee2be47fb38c2e61b56e748dc11 SHA-256: 76dbff8597d2b8673b444be6ae19964dbab73ef59517e519581e292dd5d639d3
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a VBA macro that executes upon opening the document. This macro is obfuscated and uses CreateObject to likely download and execute a second-stage payload. The presence of a Document_Open macro and obfuscated code strongly suggests a malicious intent to compromise the user's system. The specific payload and its ultimate destination are not fully discernible due to obfuscation, but the technique is consistent with macro-based malware delivery.

Heuristics 6

  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
49d27485d63118e22391f34f0c57686437341b91f1b7efbc9a81c99fde4c9e0d		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3507 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
8fbddccfd75fbfae177c653065387b317b8e0ff40b6d2920595e3fb3fc271f6c		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 14848 bytes

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