Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 76c9d93c6ce1a9ff…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.2 KB Created: 2020-07-09 21:21:56 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 10240a47a7a881c6531b7b4fd155d7a9 SHA-1: 88ee4e86e40ca0741c981fe356b34b81153fbfed SHA-256: 76c9d93c6ce1a9ffe270885f9ca110baec7838ff596c46e86c24181f90800e49
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many pointing to disposable domains, and one critical link to a known malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains text related to a camera manual, suggesting a lure to disguise the malicious intent. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, and the link farm behavior is consistent with SEO poisoning or phishing campaigns.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wb?keyword=zenit%203%20camera%20manual
    • http://files.ittakesdeathtoreachastar.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384791/4623950.pdf
    • http://files.underthehill.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969301/a9d5fefbbc5b1.pdf
    • http://files.egpscotland.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814345/2984936.pdf
    • http://files.mysaddlefitter.net/uploads/1/3/1/1/131163563/pebajitef.pdf
    • http://files.sanmateolimos.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383553/612544a.pdf
    • http://files.coastalgeorgiaaudubon.org/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969775/tolaza_gurilom_gozajelura_zixize.pdf
    • http://files.geraldinefirequeen.co.uk/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776578/zezukoveguveduzudipe.pdf
    • http://files.willowfree.ca/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740344/xiwodufa.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://tezazowu381491748.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/75950107934.pdf
    • https://xumufikok.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/femepurenuwefowomoda.pdf
    • https://pamifanasote.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/duxewudamurupapexotin.pdf
    • https://sisepufapek.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/19441551241.pdf
    • https://xobajowupoda.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/91094980628.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/45035229099.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/vuwotowomezi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/dovaxetudomorunuk.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007287.bin
9c2861f0e28089485a8f458923cbeacde6a0a63d40e51ae15af5153ad1f766d7		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7287 4660 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00008235.bin
cf5b97784df27a94849ba99a6cb145f2e70b2730a6431fdd3d51e355c4019bf9		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8235 10000 bytes

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