Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 76c275ca7fc64222…

MALICIOUS

PDF

69.8 KB Created: 2020-11-11 04:39:14 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-01-23
MD5: f3dff388f6322ed405906764da6738e8 SHA-1: 776a31571f7387689189dbeaad8932a10a44d005 SHA-256: 76c275ca7fc6422218690434c03bc0f0952526326718bef87c0543ec0e00a91e
184 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffine.ru/123?keyword=vhs+dr+seuss+video+festival In PDF document text
    • https://zipazoraxegav.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134325660/xovavagegok.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fuparududewon.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856041/tusuwagejezoxi-pilazimuben-xosozefuxe-judaxegojojuxu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kuvofexe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131163751/jedobaranarazib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4477623/normal_5fa67e08b802a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4376599/normal_5f933c3bb89c4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ginefudev.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134454890/1018048.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zelidewa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134371532/tonazofufoxulo-fakivitofuboj-bivik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369163/normal_5f89f25573050.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tozarezev.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134374844/3565077463.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4373526/normal_5f9096d78fd4a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gadevonetikob.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134358307/451ea0800b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/8518e0d8-1a18-4d29-9c2a-475c2905dea3/51273110302.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/18e0f02a-b091-4fa7-b506-9aa1ff345fcc/fusabekoruvixuxebe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/02b070cb-b728-4ce7-9c9c-ff30853fe2fc/87571256524.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3257f37b-a168-469f-a188-fe40bf30da95/nadiluvoxogezedenefuruji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/bdc6d10e-f187-4802-8f54-28cf27cfb61c/bamamafepaboviwi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/0b641292-f9d1-42fd-8f38-903e8688e28c/vuxefefapa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c25ecbc3-1206-4110-aed7-8221908b7817/ielts_speaking_book.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d59b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD59B 5020 bytes
SHA-256: 34ab34a52fb737d3c586ca047bcb7f2eaf0a78cd4e3e3988a4fa3051b78c677b
font_01_sfnt_off0000e6ae.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE6AE 10260 bytes
SHA-256: 3da78cbdaa3c61679c0bd03c1e78ce723a036dc702fd3508c4c38eda714d7c5c

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