Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 769f5f59dbd758fb…

MALICIOUS

RTF

57.6 KB
MD5: 88b8c238ca748c1b5c056364acac3336 SHA-1: cf99d9a1d8252b87797124561a08d35a4f254946 SHA-256: 769f5f59dbd758fbad94b0b7fb84afd003f87b00e5991a239ecd562c51ee991f
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object specifically identified as an Equation Editor object, which is a known indicator for the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability. The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED heuristics strongly suggests exploitation of this vulnerability for client-side execution. The ".3" suffix in the ProgID 'EqUaTiON.3' is included as an IOC.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000138e.bin
4e802f024603fa6fd4e1bffec5640360beb967fcc30cfc90e223fecc4399a970
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x138E 1798 bytes