Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 767551cf481dd3ed…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

825.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-09-18
MD5: 70e6735bcaed935c1381bb186dd67551 SHA-1: 37941431bd552ad1cd1a385c771e44fe93917f5c SHA-256: 767551cf481dd3ed20bb6cebc9d8df9ad17d91464ea70d8a7ae5e7d97510177b
252 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an OLE file that exploits CVE-2017-0199, using a URL moniker to fetch a remote loader. The embedded PDF also contains suspicious links and evasion techniques, suggesting it's part of a multi-stage attack. The primary URL http://192.3.108.47/FB/0O0O0O0IOIO0IOOIOI0OIOIOI0000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%230000000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%230000000000.dOC is likely the initial download point for the secondary payload.

Heuristics 8

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators medium PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://192.3.108.47/FB/0O0O0O0IOIO0IOOIOI0OIOIOI0000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%230000000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%230000000000.dOC
    • https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
stream_003_off00005f60.bin
2998a126f4fa11ceb265371a5f7968ec18bc4692a32631a544232dc74040021f		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x5F60 252488 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00000e00.pdf
bf732bd3b94446d60aefba6068befd7d003d91d8a3ea2223c41bd1a19c4e06b2		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE00 841728 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006400.pdf
9845e77bb79ae82876fee58216d1f5162b3f9455558a7eb92d8acb5cb7d78c8f		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6400 819712 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00029400.pdf
3574125fae08c9d6637a37fd7640846ebf88cde36a0da1e750a35f35fd6dac17		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x29400 676352 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00048000.pdf
d74688e136f17654844db528760636d9475f2edd9f794fd5452b20dbb3d97241		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x48000 550400 bytes

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