Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 766e834dc375023e…

MALICIOUS

RTF

4.5 KB
MD5: 34d138a3fead3bfa107ee640088620cc SHA-1: 1d5a45344d5dbf3c5e1d4225939eb6152ec52ea1 SHA-256: 766e834dc375023ef89fbc10cfbd95a6eff6247524445089e8d93364413871ce
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristic, indicating exploitation of a vulnerability within the Equation Editor component. The ".objupdate" directive forces the activation of this embedded object, leading to arbitrary code execution. This is a common technique for delivering malicious payloads via document attachments.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000a5.bin
dfa24931e34b645a30f9982b35d7a00803a4c9a9715e6b8c74aa41a0c68aac61
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA5 2079 bytes