RTF malware analysis — malicious · 7664fd0a78d92fef

MALICIOUS

RTF

80.4 KB First seen: 2024-10-05

MD5: 26595ba1951c5b5b9b8a328be0d93f1c SHA-1: afe1727998060a45fd092daa8189a3311d5f0823 SHA-256: 7664fd0a78d92fefa3f4b1528b7f41ad6d4f4940562ce017b2402732f2cbd9cb

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that exploits a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor. The presence of \objdata and \objupdate heuristics strongly suggests that the embedded object is designed to be activated, leading to code execution. The primary attack vector appears to be exploiting the Equation Editor vulnerability to achieve arbitrary code execution, likely for downloading and executing a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000011a3.bin` `6c84e81eadef1fcc37a10a28d991045551f022db91b6b31845e47ac68a38d3e5`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x11A3	1714 bytes

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