Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 76599e329712b18c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.0 KB Created: 2020-07-10 08:57:51 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: a5002a315897c12035fd79b07bcb52e4 SHA-1: 23b3b2c3247b40e8fef986680b9b7c1bf8547e8f SHA-256: 76599e329712b18c48e855e61781045b4f9277405acb8597b976834f3d006d93
192 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous links to external PDF files hosted on disposable domains, indicative of a link farm designed to manipulate search engine results or distribute malicious content. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure, and the ML classifier strongly flagged the document as malicious. The document body and embedded links suggest a lure for downloading content, likely leading to malware or phishing.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wb?keyword=general%20knowledge%20and%20current%20affairs%20quiz%20pdf%20free%20download
    • http://files.ottawarotarycalendar.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437471/507409a2ad9b86.pdf
    • http://files.riptidebaseball.org/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164428/wututaj.pdf
    • http://files.tatry-group.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606550/sikuledefep.pdf
    • http://files.turuan.org/uploads/1/3/2/7/132712072/tojidexizor.pdf
    • http://files.metroapplianceservice.com.au/uploads/1/3/1/1/131163920/kesomokikuvalokod.pdf
    • http://files.jesussolorio.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131859895/lovojilebuwij-fifixamimiso-lowobuwif.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://lizomezo.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/81731287321.pdf
    • https://vadobil.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/vizemigexezese.pdf
    • https://rapisikuzuv.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/robaxemefozefot.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/fexofedome.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/10217245918.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/zotogobujadafozafinuv.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006c70.bin
32af814b850ed7b66b86e92d403dcbc626931fbfe17d9124a3dce790d79ac1ae
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6C70 5568 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007f8f.bin
d016900b067a3ea6f18ea191bc94031e0f8c0e7df00dc7337c4acc416c18230c
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7F8F 10424 bytes