Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7659675d8c7c1741…

MALICIOUS

PDF

86.1 KB Created: 2021-07-13 00:11:07 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-05
MD5: f9463207fd7182a44bf1b41358147fcd SHA-1: b163c206c979b11b39c2e41594603c0b1e00bc3b SHA-256: 7659675d8c7c1741ec0ffca77ec19d1f7a7d2ebf1c39ad53ac37e630823391b6
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a PDF document that employs a social-engineering tactic to trick users into installing a browser extension or update. This is a common method for delivering malware or stealing credentials. The presence of multiple links to compromised WordPress upload directories and disposable hosting further supports its malicious nature. Although no scripts were directly extracted, the PDF structure and heuristic firings indicate it's designed to exploit user interaction for malicious purposes.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9970

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://hssipm.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/77e9fabb4d3af18dd876d213fac25567/najija.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://mytekas.com/UserFiles/file/vuvitibemetudawitiji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.hypnotiseur.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16084e92fe454c---80941197881.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jagatjyotischool.org/jagatjyotischool/userfiles/file/vudixulozalagun.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://autoschiller.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160909cfa767e0---fuzexevakupux.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://teplospectr.ru/images/files/47694656290.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nensi.si/upload/file/gusobazerodikamew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jamiatulbanat.in/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d83f6b65465---25659412251.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://crystalnymph.by/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a58892e896cc44d9f3acaa8cae01bd77/mifevotorateviziwesow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kimtuong.vn/isc/public/files/fckupload/file/71593798313.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://web-sila.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/dfe2e58871a62447e34231b11c08f957/mojumogunaralubutona.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.blackandwhite-salon.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0fc760d69204aedf9614db782595ded1/dusodoja.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.thecandystoresudbury.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5tmn0nhokk2qkqjto6n2qio0h7/66360713344.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ewinghighclassof1963.com/clients/e/e4/e4cb61fc1babc639533983e887b7272d/File/legagaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://myblindz.com/fck_user_files/file/7445797560.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://metroguards.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c8e6f1ee074---76560176339.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.brunosistemi.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160879f75ddfa3---lapapekida.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://marksiegeldds.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3ade515724a460ea93699dd63f716286/wiwuwewiwijopefu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://corpusbg.com/files/fck/file/36976328315.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nationalcardsolutions.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16093aa761f4d1---vuxekevizujarevoma.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/ngfLrbzwjls/uplcv?utm_term=do+past+perfect+tensePDF link annotation
    • http://lovewhereyoulv.wpengine.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/1effaa506e9c2a0255020790025ae563/dafodeti.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f080.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF080 10336 bytes
SHA-256: 43b8181b967fd219d8d525e1c4ed63b7c4dcbd9bf8a771aef640804314075574
font_01_sfnt_off00010804.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10804 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off00012016.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12016 16580 bytes
SHA-256: ea6929b79fda6eaee0591a78cc9fc58495a7c80ed91efad54c796adc3df43515

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.