Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 764e9dc788658077…

MALICIOUS

PDF

67.3 KB Created: 2020-12-25 22:41:43 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: c2f6bcf28c862fe57aa40bc6545f5906 SHA-1: 198f495a8b41b73b8a71072ef3646c856c6c1298 SHA-256: 764e9dc7886580773a853424fc09a5d9dda1bf5d620a1b7b4f2358fa5c1d67d2
252 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to redirector services and disposable hosting. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier indicate malicious intent, likely to phish or distribute malware. The presence of a 'download button' lure further supports this, suggesting the document is designed to trick users into clicking malicious links that ultimately lead to harmful content or exploits.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/aws?utm_term=netflix+android+apk+for+mi+tv
    • https://gimexewevojux.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134523505/remamat_nurefu_sutilewut_xoniwigaxosodu.pdf
    • https://pimelotug.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134576353/1777575.pdf
    • https://petavigavixate.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134459614/diwuwituxorawego.pdf
    • https://kojemugolipoxo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134729864/segodojawonomu.pdf
    • https://jumifusat.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134629025/4964933.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/xolizoxime/0lgekAA/govesobuxetoba.pdf
    • https://nemegadixutore.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134689972/923d23.pdf
    • https://figapizezedop.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134364787/e827efafcc2895.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/54d01d08-a766-48cb-a04e-76a3d3417860/bomeraxagakuxep.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/a3de5176-6bc5-4b70-822e-97929be01082/bototuveferesuz.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zakunafu/85055324909.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vexeliku/tuxesita.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/bevarolimesale/54964724212.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000caae.bin
dcbe1443b83a357d9a24d7afd8c8aafd4c70071aca34f00b4c2cf91962044f4f		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCAAE 5172 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000dc44.bin
f0946b50d90e210144b19bbd8338bfd84a5475e240d02f410a9f4a6c7242e190		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDC44 10504 bytes

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