Emotet — Office (OLE) / .DOCX malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 762e5ac3246051e7…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOCX

230.8 KB Created: 2020-08-14 13:39:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: f8382e43094b97f096c8e2331689b276 SHA-1: 4bcd1bf781e16ae49732f7032488894abe4827b4 SHA-256: 762e5ac3246051e7afe65aaf7244a1a9bc0ede9fdc1be60e433b6b7aeeb27bd0
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample contains VBA macros with a Document_Open auto-execution macro, which is a common technique for Emotet. Critical heuristics indicate a hidden UserForm command stager, suggesting the macro's primary purpose is to download and execute a secondary payload. ClamAV detection further supports the Emotet family attribution.

Heuristics 7

  • VBA UserForm hidden-property command stager critical OLE_VBA_USERFORM_HIDDEN_COMMAND_STAGER
    VBA auto-exec macro creates a COM object from a decoded variable and reconstructs command text through Split/Join and hidden UserForm properties such as ControlTipText, Tag, Pages, or HelpContextId. This is a high-confidence macro downloader/loader shape seen in the reviewed OLE set, but it is not an Office CVE exploit primitive.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-9321492-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-9321492-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
865c37ae518b467a18f7f7cfd8ac4fb8e2c74b2d36657a71cf7fdd09ff330211
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 8121 bytes