Office (OLE) / .DOCX malware analysis — malicious · 761e82d6d389f667

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOCX

30.5 KB Created: 2023-02-05 11:23:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word

MD5: d3c879c6eff617a406da98d9d0e0220f SHA-1: 86071c606d01ab5b1aad5df578e259f192b61190 SHA-256: 761e82d6d389f6672748a313ded2348d3284f1290a3aefb70ae6c2f279854a5c

322 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task

The sample contains VBA macros that are triggered by the Auto_Close event. These macros obfuscate API calls to construct the string 'winmgmts:\\.\root\cimv2' and then use WMI to create a new process ('Win32_Process'). The process is launched with a hidden window, indicating an attempt to execute a payload without user interaction. The ClamAV detection 'Doc.Malware.Valyria-6923037-0' further supports the malicious nature of the file.

Heuristics 8

VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE

VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATION

VBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.
ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Valyria-6923037-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Valyria-6923037-0
Auto_Close macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE

Auto_Close macro
GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ

GetObject call
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC

Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains VBA macro code
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `ce77ae86c2952a20475bdebfcfc296a2bb16442ea1e3a54baa214a8c309a9055`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	1613 bytes

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