Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 75f5e5621664ae83…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

90.1 KB Created: 2018-09-21 21:43:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-05-10
MD5: 72062f1ece5ae8db0e1da68d36c1c18b SHA-1: 0fa4fec32387c4db9870cdc6c9046a686dcadd85 SHA-256: 75f5e5621664ae839b53ad897a171da23a4c30abd1739968ab9bf7e844c666bf
62 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The presence of a legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro (AutoOpen) strongly suggests malicious intent, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload. The large slack space in the OLE structure is also a common indicator of packed or obfuscated malicious content. While the embedded URL is benign, the macro's functionality points towards a downloader or droppper.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 92,288 bytes but its declared streams total only 36,509 bytes — 55,779 bytes (60%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)