RTF malware analysis — malicious · 75dc109cb1489fca

MALICIOUS

RTF

42.4 KB First seen: 2023-07-18

MD5: 134d6c37f2edf74d9a21b3b3c545315b SHA-1: 933d9c9a0ca720a111c45d9f169bc79427fb25a1 SHA-256: 75dc109cb1489fcae33f5d991fd6cd9307287630afc73dabad40b2045774c184

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, a known exploit technique. The \objupdate directive indicates that the OLE object is designed to be activated automatically upon opening the document. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic suggests the document likely contains instructions to enable content, a common tactic for macro-based malware droppers.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000502d.bin` `f9ec2ffbfb86e9793d720682436a227c29fe2925ab6458f64b29c3b1c628da13`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x502D	1718 bytes

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