Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 75c4df46e5902cf6…

MALICIOUS

RTF

3.38 MB Created: 2024-04-03 08:46:00 First seen: 2025-06-16
MD5: e475b3f80481c7c3c326b7caf10cfd28 SHA-1: 75394e6b3ec18dfeb6a9caf265e34a77717d7df2 SHA-256: 75c4df46e5902cf6ef4117b88f8f4c1288313c4c79fd0eee134232af7b601592
322 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of malicious activity, including embedded OLE objects and a critical finding related to CVE-2017-11882. The presence of hex-encoded data within an OLE object, specifically identified as containing a PE header, strongly suggests the embedding of a secondary executable payload. The exploitation of Equation Editor via CVE-2017-11882 is a common delivery mechanism for malware.

Heuristics 9

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • PE header (with DOS stub) in hex data critical RTF_MZ_HEX
    Hex-encoded PE (MZ + DOS stub) found inside RTF — likely an embedded executable payload
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1344KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ocsp.verisign.com0
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa
    • http://csc3-2010-crl.verisign.com/CSC3-2010.crl0D
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa0
    • http://csc3-2010-aia.verisign.com/CSC3-2010.cer0
    • https://www.verisign.com/cps0*
    • http://logo.verisign.com/vslogo.gif04
    • http://crl.verisign.com/pca3-g5.crl04
    • https://www.globalsign.com/repository/0
    • http://ocsp.globalsign.com/ca/gstsacasha384g40C
    • http://secure.globalsign.com/cacert/gstsacasha384g4.crt0
    • http://crl.globalsign.com/ca/gstsacasha384g4.crl0
    • http://ocsp2.globalsign.com/rootr606
    • http://crl.globalsign.com/root-r6.crl0G

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00003a12.bin
d3f0fdc399bb4839e563aefba38b89bc2f6753158b415ba7d084d8a399a47f84
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3A12 685290 bytes
objdata_01_off0015dc18.bin
d841fb09458f28707fa3b061de849cdb7c0817ab5e9759696e1890dc6eea4516
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x15DC18 584266 bytes