Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 75b7e85faba67e38…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.0 KB Created: 2020-10-03 18:10:05 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-22
MD5: 391d5d663e1c483e30c18e4e65152119 SHA-1: a238b82ae26346c235d01a2526cd967bdca4438b SHA-256: 75b7e85faba67e38a33e2c35bda41aee47026aaee4e8543a2a32b6ec7fe143a7
124 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains embedded URLs that point to a known malicious redirector, disguised as a lockpicking guide. The document body and heuristics indicate a link farm strategy, with multiple disposable domains hosting similar PDF files. The ML classifier strongly suggests malicious intent, likely to redirect users to malicious infrastructure.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=warmane+lockpicking+guide In PDF document text
    • https://site-1037900.mozfiles.com/files/1037900/lapuronabojajisire.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037054.mozfiles.com/files/1037054/26124037915.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036756.mozfiles.com/files/1036756/xuxexojujulebeminel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036911.mozfiles.com/files/1036911/kawajunuwa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vitomob.dynoprotech.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437490/22374cdd10f491.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.beanstockbrand.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856112/kefeduk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.silverliningdesigns.co/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302871/3df6263731a0d57.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fagun.storiesonstage.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776228/purelileferek.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/a7dbce41-ecf6-4f29-9ecc-4444d482243c/18625033427.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/dad60af7-ade6-4e56-8bbf-fbf616e9bed1/tedipatewuwekofuzabidoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/a29cc5ca-7454-41e4-a7ec-b02dbb70d0bc/sutevogijekesa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/87dc951e-b7bf-47af-91ad-3c42e899e74e/pemonobagin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/0088/8483/files/algebraic_representations_of_transformations_worksheet_lesson_9-4_answers.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0496/0826/1784/files/48243132894.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0475/8500/1628/files/ximapo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/7417/5644/files/hamilton_google_drive_bootleg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006e21.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6E21 5292 bytes
SHA-256: 487671a6118fc3c92eab19be7e577d88398e0bd355d0114fa0c62124867ee93b
font_01_sfnt_off00008017.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8017 10128 bytes
SHA-256: c855ccb3bd8a8f1bc91d8a82ac3c0265ee3f8c80e921ac793d09a40ce1eda6a8

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