Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 759fcdb9a7fb7ac5…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

194.0 KB
MD5: c04862d6c6e53e4e8506d26e45fe162c SHA-1: a426399dc26b190f70773868d125522ba22692a8 SHA-256: 759fcdb9a7fb7ac55c1fa618c27c9703fb7f3d68a51cd25f09ac62a6a119e421
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file is a password-encrypted OOXML document that exploits CVE-2017-0199 via an embedded OLE object. This exploit is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload from the URL http://microsfotinternetsecurefiletransferserve.duckdns.org/office/office.doc. The document's encrypted nature and the exploit carrier strongly indicate malicious intent.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007+, AES-128)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://microsfotinternetsecurefiletransferserve.duckdns.org/office/office.doc

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