Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 759ef75e133383af…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

114.6 KB Created: 2020-06-25 10:32:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000
MD5: 02e8eab1f3b002f6b975101ede2b64a6 SHA-1: db10b294e9df891244ea98ce4bacdea115647813 SHA-256: 759ef75e133383af768b2be302dc256ad4e6720fb64eda70af76954dd29caf73
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample contains a VBA macro with a Document_Open auto-execution routine. This macro is heavily obfuscated and uses CreateObject, Shell, and exec functions, indicating it is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. The specific payload and its destination are not directly discernible due to the obfuscation, but the intent is clear.

Heuristics 6

  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
45937f0f0f095d925e9697d45c52cd5d89f3322c6131bc94400bb866b948ddec		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3245 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
353f2a7aff87868edc4cc382179830bdfa72c3836b436835856b1528454e53cb		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 14336 bytes

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