Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 759ebc8d36015ac3…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.24 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: a8af13d464549083f7112505ad6fd8ea SHA-1: 567e1c5e72d1401b524d3a6b46cf023b776c05d6 SHA-256: 759ebc8d36015ac32d02e03265e02d99d1dafda5e1f333104568f5310362e00f
110 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an Excel file that exploits CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE2Link object to download a remote payload from the URL 'https://kutt.rhaimes.com/5ngTyM'. The embedded VBA macro, while not containing directly executable statements, is present and could be used to facilitate the exploit. The presence of a secondary embedded PDF with suspicious static findings further indicates malicious intent.

Heuristics 4

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://kutt.rhaimes.com/5ngTyM
    • http://evertype.comhttp://tulrich.comCopyright
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLRupakaraRegularRupakara

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off000010ab.bin
41c2901ebda5b5d79d4a68e71278578ac4fe004bea942385b0ed0c502c07b584		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10AB 88240 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00096e00.pdf
73fd0cc5595be32b1984dbb596881e0ed12cab4d64d960f279614b15596fdcab		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x96E00 683520 bytes

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