Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7584394dd03877d5…

MALICIOUS

RTF

11.1 KB First seen: 2020-02-04
MD5: 913eb977fb499c3c51d5ffb1980af2dc SHA-1: cc5e0aa8dc6cd6f72e5bf4bb7dad7d551bc55419 SHA-256: 7584394dd03877d5945c5c9e2160178f3dcd79056b5bdf04e9baf00c5abb8add
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with an Equation Editor CLSID, indicating exploitation of a known vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The ".objupdate" directive forces activation of this object, which likely leads to the execution of a second-stage payload. No specific family could be identified, but the attack pattern is consistent with a malicious document delivered via spearphishing.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000627.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x627 4652 bytes
SHA-256: ea1bf88e3fbe3a397be0dd88271e65b2c89be35af560fc4a18ad8c402dfd020f