RTF malware analysis — malicious · 757e76e77538b507

MALICIOUS

RTF

64.4 KB First seen: 2023-08-08

MD5: dd9783da2e8fbb9ab0383e0c1641a14e SHA-1: 43af05c60ec595b3dd6b39e2eee3b686fca7ed0c SHA-256: 757e76e77538b5076603e3dd7f45cc9931ffcecae25b02364f60f6295bc5d1b1

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 User Execution T1204.002 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an RTF document that contains OLE object data and specifically targets the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates an attempt to force OLE activation, and the SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic suggests the document prompts the user to enable editing. This combination strongly indicates an exploit attempt designed to execute a malicious payload, likely a downloader.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00004081.bin` `532e1fb78e62b9df075ecd5d8e003006cc875acb01ed43a8434c208a2cd2c85c`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x4081	1547 bytes

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