Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 757cb1510119fb73…

MALICIOUS

PDF

68.5 KB Created: 2020-09-16 22:37:37 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 010cec93e20004d8bf4f96da6bac0327 SHA-1: 507c1f6d87d212f8eddef92e2407300187d164ff SHA-256: 757cb1510119fb73c65f3664275f9b648ba1bdd66355703a92ace6f393bb3465
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, with one specifically pointing to a known malicious redirector infrastructure. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains the same malicious URL. This suggests the primary purpose is to lure users into clicking malicious links, potentially for phishing or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wix?keyword=alex+clarke+killer
    • http://dugeret.blackwellgolf.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070045/zizowofogur_nuror_fosuzakobabov_kedutin.pdf
    • http://files.missdc.org/uploads/1/3/1/8/131872096/netolol-tonawevajijaw.pdf
    • http://files.blackprince.hu/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856358/vixidomixuwanab.pdf
    • http://files.liviaanneautomotive.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070754/nezudugi.pdf
    • http://mupakor.oldtel.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406717/d1f84f5dfd8789.pdf
    • http://files.shipasapfreight.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131071117/1a263.pdf
    • http://tapoma.sapientboutique.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739227/dakobudoxibap.pdf
    • http://gifum.medinfodoc.net/uploads/1/3/2/7/132710567/xasusepi.pdf
    • http://fewix.hometechsd.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407995/buwavoduzetiso.pdf
    • http://debowe.nwtf-wi.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131483492/nazijesawulokok_duxetoxapo_kalol.pdf
    • http://tajomi.catcanteri.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070420/be61ecf9.pdf
    • http://xemovimoz.enspirebrandcbd.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681072/muves.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://243a21d7-a962-415e-9def-051f1c2804e6.filesusr.com/ugd/ea2f88_aa1e091e3a854d079ffdaf13a6f866b7.pdf?index=true
    • https://a112fa92-5252-4e53-b2c2-fb77139ed4c8.filesusr.com/ugd/067ecb_2ce96abda0454a078d805ec237b515e8.pdf?index=true
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d254.bin
eb0de10011186f10be48344237b44c292ecba01f03c842d7da82b6e826f847b2		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD254 4736 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000e285.bin
9d7ab2101a7b80b41d63232d90106988ce610fa8754d27f528b1daa9486eca3d		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE285 10156 bytes

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