Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 757b733f8d797d53…

MALICIOUS

PDF

80.5 KB Created: 2020-06-13 12:40:08 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: f8dd677d41d6d7e39be37b82465bf079 SHA-1: 1bb5936b556e27eb023763e69061ef4304303a9e SHA-256: 757b733f8d797d53ebfc89350794a9a6abecd880165c3954b96456b001286ca0
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file was flagged as malicious by an ML classifier and contains a large number of external links, indicating a link farm or SEO spamming attempt. The document body contains obfuscated content and embedded URLs, suggesting it is designed to redirect users to potentially harmful websites. The presence of numerous external URIs points towards an attempt to manipulate search engine rankings or distribute malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://mail.lighthouse-gardens.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437385/131437385.html#%25D8%25B5%25D9%2588%25D8%25B1+%25D9%2582%25D8%25B7%25D8%25A9+%25D9%2585%25D8%25B6%25D8%25AD%25D9%2583%25D8%25A9+%25D8%25B1%25D8%25B3%25D9%2588%25D9%2585+%25D9%2585%25D8%25AA%25D8%25AD%25D8%25B1%25D9%2583%25D8%25A9
    • http://ninthvision.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070173/pukawab-soliwutabe-zobinivikonedox-kufemukewulariw.pdf
    • http://g84rg.bpmtc.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130588342/xegal.pdf
    • http://mta-sts.mail.carltosten.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131454359/e58a9926.pdf
    • http://sacrophonie.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130604191/a1f280ca.pdf
    • http://unswcc.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380316/befutumavoxofe.pdf
    • http://bethelliottlmft.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130639197/db599.pdf
    • http://mta-sts.mxe.lindavergnani.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130539205/4885793.pdf
    • http://brillosearch.se/uploads/1/3/0/3/130313243/migadig_filalefalomugej_burosoxebad_goxosinemozuxar.pdf
    • http://mecanizados.org/uploads/1/3/0/6/130604952/mirusik.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://xuzetepevot.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/42403078875.pdf
    • https://xakovuwer.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/87130954888.pdf
    • https://zivokot.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/farimidiravumefujenebigi.pdf
    • https://jokurana.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/bemudetizujuxizamejivin.pdf
    • https://xepuzegazit.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/10486318188.pdf
    • https://fupifezen.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/miwiburura.pdf
    • https://xulesik.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/purojasodufonalolezuxisi.pdf
    • https://filelexasebu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/4099888136.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
stream_003_off0000e009.bin
180a0216b0e27be4c59c481e9e5d99f6b1aac31925e9153bdbedd7314d0b4563		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0xE009 33052 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00011960.bin
bf87718ab382b2222e7fdc1e5b2ee1fad037257c48188962d8ece75d067e316d		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11960 8324 bytes

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