Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 756f81a7a6e897de…

MALICIOUS

PDF

90.5 KB Created: 2021-08-12 23:26:23 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-02
MD5: 629c8bb8dc0383cdc4495aacce7f56ef SHA-1: 1fe3c4fc3815e1fd19256c3c1354c64cc10c6c2f SHA-256: 756f81a7a6e897def6d1107813bf29ff113047c68a41a897bbeb2c83e0764444
256 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

This PDF file was flagged as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV. It employs social engineering tactics, specifically a 'ClickFix' lure, instructing the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal, which is a common method to bypass macro restrictions and execute arbitrary commands. The document also impersonates cloud document sharing services to trick users into interacting with it. While no scripts were directly extracted, the PDF structure and heuristics suggest it's designed to facilitate the execution of a malicious payload, likely downloaded from one of the embedded URLs.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9991

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Cloud document impersonation lure medium SE_CLOUD_DOC_LURE
    Document impersonates a cloud file-sharing service such as SharePoint, OneDrive, Google Drive, Dropbox, Box, or Microsoft 365 and asks the user to open, verify, or access a shared document
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://kcde.kr/userfiles/file/latabuzuzekidinusiser.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://arte-salon.ru/upload_picture/41345440042.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.focus.mu/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/be52589eeecd1cecf3007e5e9548972a/68856985435.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.sanier.pl/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/n8bsh4ue30ddka6vjhr509hrk1/43750100290.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://crocepadrekolbe.it/userfiles/files/61482325073.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://soft-pro.hr/upload/datoteke/80956366083.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://hijaustabilo.com/contents//files/bevar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://countrysquirefoods.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a8fcaab4a43---45620314002.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://billsky.ee/files/file/14919904679.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://seanbittinger.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/galexugekagezadaka.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.qbuildsoftware.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ded5167e63bda550ff8ef67671c11419/18020897600.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://allcreaturesinc.com/files/files/7760813674.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ukdirectremovals.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b48f773ab42474255e67ed14a79140ee/jigudevagisefirad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lukasikgroup.pl/Image/files/12158868364.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://akkoryazilim.com/userfiles/file/32216903604.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://growmytruck.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/695f04d008f2e2dcc0442d81b907099a/zivosinov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.superioreagle.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16071d5ed8baaf---48652473233.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vdgairconditioning.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1610de6660d1da---91058219401.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://a2kat.ru/userfiles/file/24055217193.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://blackhorsesc.pl/userfiles/file/najumaxunatebekefojawimer.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://amidoux-peintures.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/ledodupimavizoki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.andimoda.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0802e9e10ee086ebef0e075265e7a42b/voranewumamotu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.abcklima.hu//data/editorfile/23044258115.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/PmAiG5ZyT-k/uplcv?utm_term=google+drive+folder+on+computerPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000fb39.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFB39 17988 bytes
SHA-256: 8b4ce01073af5ac1cc3d2ef10714602b325ecfeadfdb71d90b3d049846ac9c62
font_01_sfnt_off00012afc.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12AFC 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off00014313.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14313 10840 bytes
SHA-256: 92798f99eddf02d182b73818dde19558b727e6f24d4f3b7e83a9c082b8d8319b

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