Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 754d7767d4a1e049…

MALICIOUS

PDF

3.9 KB
MD5: effe24d6acf29fb65543ede96ca1c376 SHA-1: 1466c5010da372e3be1f3372a3b5ee7e88199518 SHA-256: 754d7767d4a1e049749e0d40509fbaed5ee2fc0ba27d9a408ba86858a812b102
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and utilizes filters like ASCIIHexDecode and ASCII85Decode, which are common in PDF exploits. Heuristics indicate a PDF JavaScript exploit cluster and ML classification strongly suggests maliciousness. ClamAV also detected it as Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36178. The embedded JavaScript is likely responsible for exploiting a vulnerability to achieve code execution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 7

  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36178 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36178
  • ASCIIHexDecode filter (with exploit indicators) medium PDF_FILTER_HEX
    Hex-encoding filter present alongside exploit delivery indicators — often used to hide payload or shellcode bytes
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • String.fromCharCode low PDF_FROMCHARCODE
    String.fromCharCode found — used to construct payload strings dynamically. Common in benign JavaScript libraries for codepoint manipulation, so this alone is informational; weaponised use is also caught by the dedicated fromCharCode-stage and exploit-shape rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • ASCII85Decode filter (with exploit indicators) low PDF_FILTER_85
    ASCII85 encoding filter present alongside exploit delivery indicators — uncommon outside of obfuscation