Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7538b033c3138fe4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

48.1 KB Created: 2020-11-09 05:05:52 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-26
MD5: 6e41212ec1425dae09f5153f9600e3d0 SHA-1: b1ebaae06cfdde4eef4e92881dd7599659dbb21d SHA-256: 7538b033c3138fe4c08b5501ae161e7beffc221576c93de5c2a15f9d6634c93d
232 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a lure impersonating a government form, directing users to click on embedded links. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure, and another noted a large number of external PDF links, suggesting a link farm designed to drive traffic. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 7

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/123?keyword=ca-2+form+for+government+employees In PDF document text
    • https://pawapuso.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134312868/7636336.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rezomiwutamanap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134362688/wajeket_lizabejonokanoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://setivegubuwo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134446573/filuworobutijug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://sumifomigat.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/unnamed-file.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wijijal.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/m_audio_keystation_pro_88_keys_not_working.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fezubukuwone.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/12157212159.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mufetamutobe.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/43039138876.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://junevip.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/14782847414.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xuzed/16149429838.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pagatuj.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/56468934770.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://papunovab.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/devemarosiforogusu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tasofoju.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/build_your_own_levitating_globe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006438.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6438 5452 bytes
SHA-256: d6100fb9107a983a70284f36885f117483f6f6b361b41207942392211aa40dae
font_01_sfnt_off000076c8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x76C8 9964 bytes
SHA-256: 78a6b85ea93411cd88c77d9104a505fc47dfe36f2589aaed666af24d9f58ff91
font_02_sfnt_off00009916.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9916 17560 bytes
SHA-256: 9388e080566eab091fd33723c30bf4d25c734930317b2ea18f657dcf4633c69c

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