Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 74f3be5baf8d628c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.6 KB Created: 2020-06-01 02:29:45 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 79e3f65d3aa93a9fab0378d465f10744 SHA-1: 7213b0c0d8f36c86b7aecc477403f4c9e7ddabc9 SHA-256: 74f3be5baf8d628c3872367bcec2c9bca47e6f6fbbb70b7e18122a72e1b0433a
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains numerous external links, with a significant heuristic firing indicating a 'PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM'. The document body, though partially obfuscated, contains text related to 'Ejemplos de parrafos' and references wkhtmltopdf, suggesting a deceptive pretext. The primary URL, http://thejunctionmandurah.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857390/131857390.html, is likely part of a campaign to drive traffic to malicious or SEO-abusing content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://thejunctionmandurah.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857390/131857390.html#ejemplos+de+parrafos
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://serumaputafe.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/gebeduxizakisovenakaz.pdf
    • https://xokiwija.files.wordpress.com/2020/05/buxometilulurojanuba.pdf
    • https://duzavatax.files.wordpress.com/2020/05/jirobod.pdf
    • https://dakusimefas772971079.files.wordpress.com/2020/05/sojokafelub.pdf
    • https://dakusimefas772971079.files.wordpress.com/2020/05/pidimavalewixowumepefuve.pdf
    • https://pozoxamifafu.files.wordpress.com/2020/05/wiwejar.pdf
    • https://gosivev.files.wordpress.com/2020/05/xudivuxoril.pdf
    • https://gunusubupele.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/joxazuwozofuniluvixuz.pdf
    • https://voluvatoru.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/zojopanatufidajod.pdf
    • https://pegolupoduw.files.wordpress.com/2020/05/34962841809.pdf
    • https://xibelilunaf.files.wordpress.com/2020/05/murelosalu.pdf
    • https://bozumar.files.wordpress.com/2020/05/33148386901.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00008205.bin
0bb895355b0ac4953ed9e409594e9478b2ed09c1e04510fe74eeee4d63f2adea
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8205 10984 bytes